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ENVIRONMENTAL FRAUD BY GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTORS: A NEW APPLICATION OF THE 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
Paul W Morenberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few government scandals command greater public attention than 
allegations of wasted tax dollars. In the 1980s, reports of extravagant 
Pentagon contracts to purchase hammers and coffee makers inspired 
heightened public scrutiny of the Reagan administration's defense 
budget.! To protect public support for defense spending, then Attor-
ney General Edwin Meese III proposed a campaign to fight govern-
ment contract fraud.2 In 1986, Congress passed a key element of 
Meese's program: amendments to strengthen a venerable anti-fraud 
statute called the False Claims Act (FCA).3 
The FCA prohibits false or fraudulent claims for the payment of 
federal monies.4 The Act empowers the government to sue contrac-
tors for three times the value of a false claim plus fines and court costs. 
* Articles Editor, 1994-1995, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
The author would like to thank Professor Zygmunt J.B. Plater for his valuable insights on the 
topic of this Comment. The author would also like to thank Martin W. Gitlin, who helped define 
the topic for this Comment in research supervised by Professor Plater. 
1 In a 1984 interview, President Reagan expressed his determination to expose defense 
contract fraud: "All these figures about $500 hammers and wrenches and so forth, it's all true. 
But nobody has pointed out that we're providing those figures. This is what has been going on, 
and this Defense Department is finding [fraud] and correcting it." Interview with Tom Winter 
& Joseph Baldacchino, Jr., of Human Events, PUB. PAPERS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN: 1984, BOOK 
II 1891, 1892 (Dec. 6, 1984). 
2 See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
331 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The False Claims Act was enacted in 1863 
to combat defense procurement fraud during the Civil War. See infra notes 12-14 and accom-
panying text. 
431 U.S.C. § 3729(a). 
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In addition, the FCA includes a qui tam5 provision that allows private 
citizens to sue on behalf of the government6 and to collect a substantial 
bounty.7 Traditionally, the FCA has been used against defense con-
tractors.S Yet the FCA embraces fraudulent claims involving any 
government-funded program.9 In theory, the FCA can be used to sue 
government contractors that overcharge the government for cleaning 
up hazardous waste sites. 
This Comment explores potential applications of the FCA to com-
bat "environmental fraud." As used in this Comment, environmental 
fraud describes two major practices: (1) fraud in the procurement or 
performance of contracts to provide environmental services;lO and (2) 
fraud in other contracts arising from violations of environmental laws 
or regulations. ll Section II presents a brief history of the FCA. Sec-
tion III examines the modern FCA, analyzing the elements of a false 
claim, the qui tam provisions that authorize private prosecution, and 
defenses to an FCA action. Section IV examines the significance of 
5 Qui tam describes any legal action brought by an individual on behalf of the government 
and the individual. Qui tam is the shortened form of the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege 
quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur" (translated as "[ w ]ho sues on behalf of the King as well 
as for himself'). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990). Qui tam plaintiffs are often 
called relators or informers. See id. at 1251, 1289. 
Most federal environmental statutes enable members of the public to file citizens' suits. See, 
e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Citizens' suits and 
qui tam actions, however, are fundamentally different. In a citizens' suit, a private individual 
sues on behalf of the public, but the citizen does not represent the government. In qui tam 
actions, the relator sues on behalf of the United States to redress an injury suffered by the 
government. See Valeri R. Park, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Relators, and the Government: 
Which is the Real Party to the Action?, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1065 (1991). 
631 U.S.C. § 3730(b); see infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text. 
731 U.S.C. § 3730(d). Qui tam actions, unlike environmental citizen suits, allow private 
citizens to recover a portion of the government's judgment or settlement. See infra notes 173-87 
and accompanying text. 
8 See John R. Phillips, Qui Tam Litigation: A New Forum for Prosecuting False Claims 
Against the Government, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 267, 272 (1993) ("Approximately 75% of the 304 qui 
tam cases filed since 1986 have been against defense contractors."). 
9 See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968) (holding that the FCA 
applies to all fraudulent attempts to obtain money from the government). 
10 The FCA could be applied to challenge the fraudulent performance of cleanup and abate-
ment contracts supervised by the Environmental Protection Agency. See Martin W. Gitlin, The 
Private War Against Eco-Fraud: The False Claims Act as an Environmental Statute 4 (May 3, 
1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law 
Review). 
11 Steve France, The Private War on Pentagon Fraud, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 46, 48. Bradley 
Weiss, a former member of the Pentagon Inspector General's Office, has predicted that the FCA 
will be used to sue contractors that violate environmental laws or regulations. "Compliance with 
environmental law is obligatory in any government contract. Therefore, noncompliance entails 
a false claim." [d. (statement of Weiss). 
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federal contract law in establishing FCA violations. This section also 
considers the environmental obligations of government contractors. 
Finally, Section V considers potential applications of the FCA to 
combat environmental fraud in government-funded programs. 
II. HISTORY OF THE FCA 
A. The Civilian War Against Defense Fraud 
Enacted during the Civil War, the FCA 12 was intended to root out 
rampant fraud by the contractors that supplied the Union Army.13 The 
legislative history suggests congressional concern focused on corrup-
tion in the military procurement process.14 While the FCA targeted 
defense contractors, the statute's language was broad enough to em-
brace any fraud that resulted in financial loss to the federal govern-
ment.15 According to an early opinion by the United States District 
Court for the District of Oregon, Congress enacted the FCA "to 
protect the Treasury against the hungry and unscrupulous host that 
encompasses it on every side."16 
President Lincoln recognized that the federal government could not 
adequately police powerful contractorsP Lincoln thus insisted that 
the FCA include a qui tam provision to reward informers who assist 
the government in prosecuting fraud.18 Lincoln and his congressional 
supporters believed that informers would not come forward without 
12 Act of Mar. 2,1863, ch. 67, § 6,12 Stat. 696 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 
(1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
13 See Elletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives 
for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 302 (1992). 
14 Note, Qui Thm Suits Under the Federal False Claims Act: Thol of the Private Litigant in 
Public Actions, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 446, 453--54 (1972) [hereinafter Thol of the Private LitigantJ. 
Senator Howard, the sponsor of the bill, spoke to the urgency of fraud prevention: 
[TJhe bill has been prepared at the urgent solicitation of the officers who are connected 
with the administration of the War Department and the Treasury Department. The 
country, as we know, has been full of complaints reflecting the frauds and corruptions 
practiced in obtaining pay from the Government during the present war ... further 
legislation is pressingly necessary to prevent this great evil. 
Id. at 453 n.32 (quoting CONGo GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1863». 
15 See M. Russell Kruse, Jr., Note, False Claims Act-The Civil War Antitrust Sword: United 
States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 25 Sw. L.J. 764, 764 & n.6 (citing CONGo GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d 
Sess. 952 (1863». 
16 United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885) (denying government motion to satisfy 
judgement because motion would deprive qui tam relator of his share of the judgment still owed 
by defendant). 
17 See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 13, at 302 & n.112; see also France, supra note 11, at 47. 
18 Callahan and Dworkin, supra note 13, at 302 n.112; France, supra note 11, at 47. 
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a powerful financiallure.19 The original FCA guaranteed the informer 
one-half of the damages collected.20 Because the Act allowed for dou-
ble damages, the government would still be fully compensated for its 
lossP In addition, the qui tam relator was entitled to recover reason-
able expenses and costs from the defendant.22 
B. The 1943 Amendments: Restraining the Relator 
After the Civil War, the FCA fell into relative disuse.23 However, 
the Act was rediscovered in the 1940s-an era of significant expansion 
in federal spending. In the pivotal case of United States ex rel. Marcus 
v. Hess, the Supreme Court heard an appeal by electrical contractors 
that defrauded the Public Works Administration through collusive 
bidding.24 Following a criminal indictment against Hess, Marcus filed 
a qui tam action and received one-half of a $315,000 judgment.25 De-
spite the fact that Marcus may not have provided any new evidence 
against the defendant, the Supreme Court held that the FCA did not 
preclude civil suits based on information from a prior indictment.26 
Following the Marcus decision, Congress debated sweeping amend-
ments to restrict qui tam relators.27 Legislators questioned the wis-
dom of allowing private citizens to profit from the prosecution of 
crimes known to the government.28 While the House of Represen-
tatives attempted to repeal qui tam, the Senate supported "the reten-
tion of qui tam suits, with restrictions."29 Congress ultimately barred 
qui tam suits that utilize information possessed by the government, 
19 Senator Howard of Michigan declared that the qui tam provision of the bill rested "upon 
the old-fashioned idea of holding out a temptation and 'setting a rogue to catch a rogue.'" Gitlin, 
supra note 10, at 6 n.23 (quoting CONGo GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955-56 (1863». See also 
Griswold, 24 F. at 366 (noting that the principle of qui tam recognizes "the strong stimulus of 
personal ill will or the hope of gain"). 
20 The original FCA provided: 
The person bringing said suit and prosecuting it to final judgement shall be entitled to 
receive one-half the amount of such forfeiture, as well as one-half the amount of the 
damages he shall recover and collect; and the other half thereof shall belong to and be 
paid over to the United States. 
31 U.S.C. § 234 (1940) (repealed 1943). 
21 See Kruse, supra note 15, at 765. 
22 31 U.S.C. § 234 (1940) (repealed 1943). 
231bol of the Private Litigant, supra note 14, at 455. 
24 317 U.S. 537, 539 (1943). 
25 See id. at 540, 545. 
26 See id. at 545, 546 & n.9. 
'l:l S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1986) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 345], reprinted 
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5276-77. 
28 See id. 
29 [d. 
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even in cases where the relator discovered the alleged fraud.30 In 
addition, Congress instituted a notice requirement that compelled qui 
tam plaintiffs to advise the government of their claims and to disclose 
significant evidence.3! The amendments allowed the United States to 
join qui tam suits and to control the litigation strategy.32 
The 1943 amendments also reduced relator awards. If the govern-
ment successfully prosecuted an action begun by a relator, the amend-
ments authorized the court to award the relator a "reasonable" award 
not to exceed one-tenth of the judgment.33 If the government did not 
intervene, the amendments authorized the court to award a "reason-
able" sum not to exceed one-quarter of the judgment.34 In either case, 
the court had the discretion to provide little or no compensation to 
the relator.35 
The 1943 amendments to the FCA resulted in a virtual cessation of 
qui tam lawsuits. According to one commentator, the amendments 
occasioned an "ice age for FCA qui tam" that would last more than 
four decades.36 Potential relators feared the government's power to 
intervene in qui tam lawsuits, to control the litigation strategy, and 
to reduce the relator's financial stake in any judgment.37 
Another reason for the qui tam ice age was strict judicial enforce-
ment of the FCA's jurisdictional bar against private actions arising 
from information in the government's possession.3s This jurisdictional 
bar applied to cases in which the government took no action.39 The bar 
even applied to cases where the prospective relator was the original 
source of the government's information.40 
30Id. 
3! Id. at 12. The 1943 amendments required qui tam relators to serve the government with 
"[aJ copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and 
information." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1982) (amended 1986). 
32 In cases where the government initiated proceedings, the 1943 amendments provided that 
litigation "is conducted only by the Government." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (1982) (amended 1986). 
This section further provided that "[tJhe Government is not bound by an act of the person 
bringing the action." Id. 
33Id. § 3730(c)(I) (1982) (amended 1986). 
34 Id. § 3730(c)(2) (1982) (amended 1986). 
35Id. § 3730(c)(I), (2) (1982) (amended 1986). Both subsections provided that the relator "may 
receive an amount the court decides is reasonable." Id. 
36 Park, supra note 5, at 1066. 
37Id. 
38 See supra text accompanying note 30. 
39 See United States ex. rel Lapin v. International Business Machines Corp., 490 F. Supp. 244, 
247 (D. Haw. 1980) (disallowing a qui tam action even after the Government failed to investigate 
or prosecute alleged FCA violations). 
40 United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1104, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (forbidding 
Wisconsin to act as qui tam relator because Federal law required states to disclose evidence of 
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C. The 1986 Amendments: Revitalizing the Relator 
In the early 1980s, government officials began to express renewed 
concern over the rise in fraud in both defense and human services 
spending. In 1984, the Department of Defense conducted 2,311 fraud 
investigations-a thirty percent increase compared to 1982 investiga-
tions.41 Testifying before a House of Representatives subcommittee 
in 1985, Department of Defense Inspector General Joseph Sherick 
reported that nine of the ten largest defense contractors were under 
investigation.42 Although instances of military procurement fraud domi-
nated the headlines, the problem of rising fraud plagued other federal 
programs as well. The Department of Health and Human Services, 
for example, reported a three-fold increase in entitlement fraud cases 
over a three-year period.43 
Government prosecutors were ill-equipped to handle this exploding 
case load. For example, while the Department of Justice Civil Division 
received 2,850 fraud referrals in fiscal year 1984, the division obtained 
only seventy settlements or judgments.44 Officials at the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) began to view government prosecution of contract 
fraud as a losing battle. 
The DOJ first proposed amendments to strengthen the FCA in 
1979.45 However, the DOJ proposal did not garner significant support 
until Attorney General Edwin Meese III presented the proposal in 
1985 as part of his Anti-Fraud Enforcement Package.46 The Reagan 
administration viewed the FCA amendments as a rare political op-
portunity to promote the often conflicting goals of more defense and 
less government. 
In August, 1985, Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa introduced the 
False Claims Reform Act, which incorporated most of the DOJ pro-
posal.47 Echoing the rhetoric of Civil War legislators, Grassley and his 
supporters resolved to punish unscrupulous contractors that swindle 
Medicaid fraud to the Department of Social Services). The Federal government declined to 
pursue the case and filed an unsuccessful amicus brief supporting Wisconsin's right to sue. See 
S. REP. No. 345, supra note 27, at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5278. 
41 S. REP. No. 345, supra note 27, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266-Q7. 
42 [d. 
43 [d. 
44 In Fiscal Year 1985, the statistics were equally alarming: 2,734 fraud referrals and only 54 
settlements or judgments. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 27, at 4 n.10, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269. 
45 See S. REP. No. 345, supra note 27, at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5278. 
46 [d. 
47 [d. 
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the government and the taxpayer.48 The amendments expanded the 
FCA definition of fraud49 and increased both statutory fines50 and 
damages.51 In addition, the amendments attempted to promote qui 
tam suits by liberalizing the requirements for standing52 and enhanc-
ing relator awards.53 
The False Claims Reform Act passed Congress unanimously in 
October, 1986.54 The amendments had an almost immediate impact on 
qui tam prosecutions and awards. While the DOJ received about six 
qui tam cases a year before 1986, the DOJ recorded 100 cases in the 
first ten months of 1989.55 In Fiscal Year 1985, the United States 
recovered only $27 million under the FCA; in Fiscal Year 1989, recov-
eries skyrocketed to $225 million.56 
Most significant recoveries under the amended FCA have involved 
defense contracts. These recoveries, however, have inspired a small 
army of FCA "bounty hunters" who are applying the statute to com-
bat fraud beyond the military-industrial complex. Recently, the FCA 
has been invoked to challenge fraud in Medicare billings,57 federally 
funded research at universities,58 and Small Business Administration 
loans.59 The promise of large FCA recoveries has spawned a growing 
qui tam bar.60 The growth of this bar has been fueled by extensive 
media coverage of FCA lawsuits.61 
48 See Michael S. McGarry, Winning the War on Procurement Fraud: Victory at What Price?, 
26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 249, 257 n.56 (1993) (citing Congress Puts More Teeth in 
Anti-Fraud Law, CONGo Q. ALMANAC 86 (Mary W. Cohn ed. 1986». Senator Grassley described 
the passage of the FCA amendments as "one more sign that the American people have had 
enough of those who exploit taxpayers and erode national security for their own profit." [d. 
49 See infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text. 
60 See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
61 See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. 
62 See infra notes 163--67 and accompanying text. 
63 See infra notes 173--87 and accompanying text. 
64 France, supra note 11, at 46. 
66 [d. at 48. 
66 Park, supra note 5, at 1067 n.42 (citing James Dever, Double Jeopardy, False Claims, and 
United States V. Halper, 20 PUB. CONT. L.J. 56, 63 n.20 (1990». 
67 See, e.g., United States V. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 437 (1989) (using FCA to sue laboratory 
manager who fraudulently billed Medicare). 
63 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Milam V. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 
961 F.2d 46, 48, 49 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming right of qui tam relator to sue state university that 
submitted false data in order to obtain federal grants). 
69 See, e.g., United States V. Davis, 809 F.2d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir. 1987) (applying the FCA 
against a borrower who improperly used a loan from the Small Business Administration to 
remodel home and make payments on boat). 
60 See France, supra note 11, at 46 ("[Elver more attorneys are attracted by the huge sums 
of money potentially recoverable and the idea of serving the taxpayers at the same time."). 
61 Most coverage of FCA litigation has appeared in law journals and newspapers. Callahan & 
I 
/ 
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III. THE FCA OF 1986 
A. Elements of a False Claim 
There are three central elements of an FCA action: (1) a claim for 
payment by the United States government; (2) that is false or fraudu-
lent; and (3) that is knowingly presented.62 The FCA encompasses 
claims in a wide variety of payment contexts, including contracts for 
military procurement, construction, or other services; benefit pay-
ments for health care and welfare; government loans; and housing 
subsidies.63 
1. Claims Against the United States 
The FCA defines a "claim" as any request for money or property 
by a contractor, grantee, or other recipient.64 This expansive definition 
applies to any transaction where the United States "provides any 
portion of the money or property."65 In addition to programs directly 
funded by the federal government, the FCA embraces state, local, and 
private programs that receive federal reimbursement.66 
2. False or Fraudulent Claims 
The FCA outlines seven different practices that constitute a false 
claim.67 The most common is the presentation of a "false or fraudulent 
Dworkin, supra note 13, at 317 & nn. 175-76. The broadcast media, however, has recently offered 
sensationalistic coverage of FCA settlements. One television journalist introduced a story on 
the FCA as follows: "How would you like to become a multimillionaire, spend the rest of your 
life playing golf or going fishing? Swindle the government? No, help the government catch some 
people who did." 60 Minutes: Getting Rich (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 16, 1994) (statement 
of Lesley Stahl) (transcript on file with the Boston College Environrrumtal Affairs Law Review). 
62 Robert L. Vogel, Citizens'Lawsuits Based on the False Claims Act Have Multiplied, NAT'L 
L.J., Nov. 26, 1990, at 20, 20. 
63 Earl K. Cantwell, False Claims Act: 1986 Amendments Spawn Increased New Filings, 60 
DEF. COUNS. J. 274, 274 (1993). 
64 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (1988). The FCA defines a claim as follows: 
Id. 
[A]ny request or demand, whether under contract or otherwise, for money or property 
which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States Govern-
ment provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded, 
or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for 
any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded. 
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g., United States v. O'Connell, 890 F.2d 563, 564-65 (lst Cir. 1989) (finding FCA 
violation in fraudulent payment request submitted to state agency that disburses federal 
development grants). 
67 31 U.S.C § 3729(a) (1988). This section extends FCA liability to any individual who: 
1995] FALSE CLAIMS ACT 631 
claim for [government] payment or approval."68 It is important to note 
that the government need not incur an actual financial loss to litigate 
a false claim for payment.69 Indeed, the FCA views the submission of 
"false records or statements" which support a payment request as a 
false claim.70 
The FCA neglects to define the phrase "false or fraudulent claim" 
or to provide illustrative examples.71 The statute embraces acts of 
error, oversight, and mismanagement as well as acts of deliberate 
fraud. Thus, a false claim can be prosecuted for the claim's mere 
"falseness" without any evidence of fraudulent conduct.72 The distinc-
[d. 
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the 
United States Government or a member ofthe Armed Forces of the United States a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; 
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement 
to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government; 
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim 
allowed or paid; 
(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by 
the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully to conceal the 
property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the amount for which 
the person receives a certificate or receipt; 
(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or 
to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or 
delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is 
true; 
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property 
from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, 
who lawfully may not sell or pledge the property; or 
(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement 
to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to payor transmit money or property to 
the Government. 
68 [d. § 3729(a)(1). 
69 United States v. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp. 1120, 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (concluding that 
the government can recover without proving an injury resulted from fraudulent Medicare or 
Medicaid claims); Thevenot v. National Flood Ins. Program, 620 F. Supp. 391, 395 (W.D. La. 
1985) (holding that government may recover statutory penalty without paying out any funds). 
70 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (1988). This section allows FCA prosecution for the submission of 
false claims without evidence of actual payment. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Luther v. 
Consolidated Indus., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 919, 924 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (permitting FCA recovery 
where the government neither paid nor approved false claim). 
71 31 U.S.C § 3729(a). 
72 See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 585 F.2d 284, 288 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding defendant liable 
for fraudulent bidding without establishing intent to defraud); Fleming v. United States, 336 
F.2d 475, 479 (10th Cir.) (holding grain dealer liable under FCA for false certification that grain 
had been delivered), em. denied, 380 U.S. 907 (1964); United States v. Eagle Beef Cloth Co., 
Inc., 235 F. Supp. 491, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (determining that defendant is liable for submitting 
false claim to Commodity Credit Corporation although plaintiff did not prove fraud and deceit 
by defendant). 
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tion between false and fraudulent claims reflects the "FCA's require-
ment that a false claim be 'knowing' but that 'no specific intent to 
defraud is required."'73 
In addition to outlawing false or fraudulent payment requests, the 
FCA forbids related forms of fraud. For example, the FCA prohibits 
conspiracies to obtain payment or approval of a false claim.74 The Act 
also forbids fraud in the management and disposition of federal prop-
erty and money that causes the government to receive less value.75 
Finally, the 1986 amendments establish a new category of false claims 
known as "reverse false claims,"76 which are fraudulent attempts to 
avoid paying an obligation to the government.77 
In amending the FCA definition of false claims, Congress intended 
that the statute sweep as broadly as possible.78 Consequently, the 
FCA does not provide specific examples of false claims. Since 1986, 
FCA plaintiffs have attacked several common practices which are 
discussed below. 
a. Claims for Services that Are Improperly Provided 
Perhaps the simplest form of federal contract fraud is the request 
for government funds to reimburse services that were not properly 
delivered. Many health care providers, for example, attempt to charge 
the government for medical procedures that are not provided79 or not 
needed.80 The government can use the FCA to recoup any expended 
funds and to collect civil penalties against the defendant. In Medicaid 
cases, courts have concluded that every medical procedure that is 
falsely billed represents a separate false claim.81 Thus, FCA plaintiffs 
73 Gitlin, supra note 10, at 15 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a), (b»; see United States v. DiBona, 
614 F. Supp. 40, 43-44 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (noting that the phrase "false or fraudulent" uses 
disjunctive form of "or" because the FCA does not require intent to defraud). For a more 
complete discussion of scienter, see infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. 
74 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3). 
76 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(4)-(6). 
76 S. REP. No. 345, supra note 27, at 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5280. 
77 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7). The concept of reverse false claims does not apply to income tax 
refunds, which are expressly exempted by the statute. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(e) ("This section 
does not apply to claims, records, or statements made under the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954.") 
78 The FCA "was intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result 
in financial loss to the government." S. REP. No. 345, supra note 27, at 19, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5284 (quoting United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968». 
79 See, e.g., United States v. Diamond, 657 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding doctor 
liable for civil penalties assessed for each false Medicare claim submitted). 
80 United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1381--82 (6th Cir.) (holding that the provision of 
unnecessary services to a Medicare patient constitutes a false claim because billing form certifies 
that services were "medically indicated and necessary"), eert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988). 
81 Diamond, 657 F. Supp. at 1206. 
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can seek multiple civil penalties for each fraudulent claim or report 
submitted to the government. 
b. Product Defects and Product Substitutions 
Contractors that provide defective or inferior products can be held 
liable for fraud under the FCA. When contractors knowingly violate 
contract specifications, the contractors submit false claims for pay-
ment.82 For example, in Faulk v. United States, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that a dairy producer 
committed fraud under the FCA in providing the Air Force with 
recombined milk rather than fresh milk, which the contract specified.83 
In United States v. Aerodex,84 the Fifth Circuit similarly affirmed an 
FCA judgment against a defendant that did not provide the specific 
model of ballbearings that the Navy requested.85 
c. False Pricing 
When the government solicits bids for specialized services that few 
contractors can provide, contractors often inflate prices.86 The FCA 
has been used to combat such "false pricing" schemes by government 
contractors. The Truth in Negotiations Act (TIN A) obliges contrac-
tors to certify that cost estimates are current, accurate, and com-
plete.87 An FCA suit for defective pricing must allege that a contrac-
tor knowingly submitted noncurrent, inaccurate, or incomplete 
pricing data.88 
3. The Knowledge Requirement 
Before the 1986 amendments, the FCA required that the government 
establish a defendant's "actual knowledge" of fraud. In applying this 
ambiguous standard, some courts asserted that the government must 
demonstrate a defendant's specific intent to submit a false claim.89 
Congress feared that such readings of the FCA enabled corporate 
82 See infra notes 282-90 and accompanying text. 
&'! 198 F.2d 169, 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1952). 
84 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972). 
86 [d. at 1006, 1008. 
86 See David O. Stewart, Recent Developments in the False Claims Act, 20 PUB. CONT. L.J. 
386, 393 (1991). 
87 10 U.S.C. § 2306a (1988); see infra text accompanying notes 245-49. 
88 See infra text accompanying notes 248-52. 
89 See, e.g., United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding specific 
intent to defraud where contractor altered deficient ball bearings to create appearance that 
bearings met contract specifications). 
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leaders to avoid liability by distancing themselves from the manage-
ment of government contracts.90 Legislators argued that the amended 
FCA should reach the '''ostrich-like' conduct which can occur in large 
corporations."91 
The 1986 amendments clarify the scienter requirement of the FCA 
by delineating three mental states that constitute knowledge of a false 
claim: (1) actual knowledge; (2) deliberate ignorance of truth or falsity; 
or (3) reckless disregard of truth or falsity.92 The FCA declares that 
proof of "specific intent to defraud" is never required.93 According to 
the legislative history, "constructive knowledge" may be sufficient to 
create FCA liability when a responsible official fails to ascertain the 
accuracy of a claim.94 Thus, contractors owe the government a duty of 
"limited inquiry" when submitting claims for payment.95 Under this 
standard, employers can be found liable for false claims known to their 
employees.96 
4. Burden of Proof 
Before the 1986 amendments, the FCA did not establish the govern-
ment's burden of proof.97 Consequently, courts were left to infer the 
intent of Congress. While some courts favored a low standard of "pre-
90 s. REP. No. 345, supra note 27, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5272. 
91 Id. 
92 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1988). The FCA specifically states that: 
Id. 
[T]he terms "knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to the 
information-
1) has actual knowledge of the information; 
2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or 
3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, and no proof 
of specific intent to defraud is required. 
93 Id; see, e.g., United States v. Oakwood Downriver Medical Ctr., 687 F. Supp. 302, 306 (E.D. 
Mich. 1988); DiBona, 614 F. Supp. at 43-44; SGW, Inc. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 174, 178 (1990). 
94 S. REP. No. 345, supra note 27, at 7, 20, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5272, 5285. The 
Senate Report states: 
The Committee is firm in its intention that the act not punish honest mistakes or 
incorrect claims submitted through mere negligence. But the Committee does believe 
the civil False Claims Act should recognize that those doing business with the Gov-
ernment have an obligation to make a limited inquiry to ensure the claims they submit 
are accurate. 
Id. at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5272. 
95 Id. 
96 See, e.g., United States v. O'Connell, 890 F.2d 563, 569 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding corporation 
liable for fraud of its agent even when corporation received no benefit from fraud); Grand Union 
Co. v. United States, 696 F.2d 888, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983) (ruling that where cashiers accepted 
food stamps for ineligible items, cashiers' knowledge can be imputed to defendant company). 
97 S. REP. No. 345, supra note 27, at 31, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5296. 
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ponderance of the evidence,"98 other courts favored the higher stand-
ard of "clear and convincing evidence."99 In the 1986 amendments, 
Congress expressed its preference for the preponderance standard.loo 
5. Damages 
Before 1986, FCA defendants were liable for civil penalties of $2,000 
per false claim and double damages. lOl In amending the FCA, Con-
gress enlarged both civil penalties lO2 and the formula for calculating 
damages. 103 The sponsors hoped that substantially higher fines and 
damages would deter contract fraud. In addition to expanding dam-
ages, Congress increased qui tam awards to encourage greater pri-
vate enforcement of the FCA.104 It should be noted that qui tam 
awards are calculated as a percentage of the entire FCA judgment.lo5 
In other words, the percentage is applied to both civil penalties and 
civil damages. 
a. Civil Penalties 
The FCA provides for civil penalties between $5,000 and $10,000 
for each violation of the Act.106 According to the legislative history, 
these "forfeiture" penalties are "automatic and mandatory for each 
claim which is found to be false."!07 Thus, civil penalties can become 
quite sizeable in complex transactions.lo8 For example, if a contrac-
tor submitted one hundred false invoices, civil penalties could reach 
$1,000,000. 
To collect forfeiture penalties, the government need not prove that 
it suffered any financialloss.lo9 Most courts view forfeiture penalties 
98 See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1983). 
99 See United States v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 447 F.2d 100, 101 (2d Cir. 1971). 
100 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (1988) ("In any action brought under section 3730, the United States 
shall be required to prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including damages, by a 
preponderance of the evidence."). 
101 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982) (amended 1986). 
102 See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
103 See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. 
104 Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 13, at 303--D4. 
105 See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. 
106 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988). 
107 S. REP. No. 345, supra note 27, at 8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5273. 
108 See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 697 F. Supp. 167, 179 (D.N.J. 1988) (finding 16 
separate civil penalties for nine false claims, six false reports, and conspiracy). 
109 See, e.g., Fleming v. United States, 336 F.2d 475, 480 (10th Cir. 1964) (holding that govern-
ment may recover forfeiture penalty without proof of damage). 
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as punitive rather than compensatory.110 Nevertheless, some defen-
dants have successfully challenged forfeiture penalties that are grossly 
disproportionate to the government's loss.111 
b. Civil Damages 
In addition to forfeiture penalties, the FCA provides for damages 
of three times the amount of the government's financial loss arising 
from a false claim.112 These damages may only be recovered upon the 
government's demonstration of an actual financiallossY3 Additionally, 
the FCA provides for lower damages-two times the government's 
loss-in cases where the defendant promptly provides the govern-
ment with all information pertaining to the violation and cooperates 
fully with the government's investigation.114 
The FCA does not provide any specific method for calculating the 
government's damages.115 Thus, the computation of damages varies in 
different contexts. In a case of collusive bidding, for example, dam-
ages typically consist of the difference between the actual contract 
price and the estimated fair market value of the contract if the bidding 
process had been open and competitive.116 In a case of overpriced 
goods, damages represent the difference between the actual contract 
price and the reasonable value of the goods delivered.ll7 
c. Consequential Damages 
In addition to seeking "actual" damages, some plaintiffs have sought 
"consequential damages" for repair costs and other expenses incurred 
by the government. In Marcus v. Hess, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the government was sufficiently compensated for its costs through 
the double damages provision of the pre-1986 statute.l1S In United 
States v. Aerodex, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit rejected consequential damages awarded by the district COurt.119 
110 See In re Commonwealth Cos., Inc., 913 F.2d 518, 526 (8th Cir. 1990). 
111 See infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text. 
112 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988). 
113 See United States v. DiBona, 614 F. Supp. 40,43 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that government 
must prove financial loss to collect more than the forfeiture penalty). 
114 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). 
115 United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1532 (11th Cir. 1988) (dictum) (stating that the 
FCA provides "no set formula" to calculate actual damages). 
116Id. at 1532. 
117 United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1972). 
118 Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551--52 (1943). 
119 See Aerodex, 469 F.2d at 1011. 
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In Aerodex, the Navy expended $27,000 for defective bearings, which 
it replaced at a cost of over $160,000.120 The court ruled that the 
government's costs were fully compensated by double damages of 
$54,000--twice the contract price of $27,000.121 
Although the Aerodex court firmly rejected consequential damages, 
other courts have awarded "repair" expenses in similar cases. In 
United States v. Ekelman & Associates, Inc., the defendants falsified 
applications for loans guaranteed by the Veterans Administration or 
insured by the Federal Housing Authority.l22 After the loans went into 
default, the government expended funds to maintain the property 
until the property's resale.123 In Ekelman, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit awarded the government not only its 
losses due to the default but also its maintenance and repair costs 
after foreclosure. l24 According to one commentator, post-Aerodex cases 
like Ekelman have "muddied the waters as to the recoverability of 
consequential damages."125 
6. Statute of Limitations 
Prior to 1986, false claims actions were required to be brought 
within six years of the alleged violation.126 In applying this standard, 
courts did not exempt lawsuits that were time-barred due to a delay 
in discovering the violation.127 The 1986 amendments remedied this 
situation by allowing plaintiffs to file suit before the later of two 
deadlines: (1) six years after the violation; or (2) three years after the 
violation is known, or should have been known, provided that not 
more than ten years have elapsed since the violation.l28 The purpose 
12{) [d. at 1006. 
121 [d. at 1011. Although FCA liability was limited to $60,000 ($54,000 in double damages plus 
$6,000 in forfeiture penalties), the court required Aerodex to pay $160,000 for breach of war-
ranty. [d. at 1013. 
122 532 F.2d 545, 547 (6th Cir. 1976). 
123 [d. at 547, 551. 
124 See id. In awarding these damages, the court stated that Aerodex "is distinguishable on 
its facts and not inconsistent with our views on this issue." [d. at 551. 
125 Michael Waldman, Damage Control: A Defendant's Approach to the Damage and Penalty 
Provisions of the Civil False Claims Act, 21 PUB. CONT. L.J. 131, 138 (1992). Waldman specu-
lates that the Ekelman court "may have intended to distinguish between 'incidental damages' 
such as the care of rejected goods and 'consequential damages' such as those present in 
Aerodex." [d. at 139 n.32. 
126 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) (1982) (amended 1986). 
127 See United States v. Borin, 209 F.2d 145, 147-48 (5th Cir.) (barring FCA action even though 
prosecution occurred within six years of government's discovery of fraud), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 
821 (1954). 
128 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) (1988). 
638 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:623 
of this flexible standard is to discourage defendants from concealing 
evidence of wrongdoing.129 
7. Retroactivity of the 1986 Amendments 
As noted above, the 1986 amendments strengthened the FCA by 
broadening liability, increasing damages, and extending the statute of 
limitations. Consequently, many plaintiffs have sought to apply the 
amended statute retroactively to violations that occurred before Oc-
tober, 1986.130 
Until recently, the question of FCA retroactivity has remained 
unclear. Although courts have generally supported the principle that 
new or amended legislation applies only prospectively,131 the Supreme 
Court created exceptions for cases on appeal.132 As a result, many 
lower courts applied the FCA retroactively in the late 1980s.133 
In United States v. Murphy, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit opposed retroactive application of the FCA.134 
The Sixth Circuit rejected retroactive application of the FCA's amended 
definition of knowledge because the new definition would expand the 
defendant's liability for past violations.135 Since the Murphy decision, 
most district courts have rejected retroactive application of the FCA.l36 
Judicial opposition to FCA retroactivity is likely to continue unless 
Congress amends the FCA.137 
129 See United States v. CFW Constr. Co., Inc., 649 F. Supp. 616, 619 (D.S.C. 1986) (holding 
that defendant's fraudulent concealment of facts tolls the FCA statute of limitations); United 
States v. Uzzell, 648 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (D.D.C. 1986) (ruling that "equitable tolling" permits 
statute of limitations to commence after government's discovery of fraud). 
130 See generally Robert S. Metzger & Robert D. Goldbaum, Retroactivity of the 1986 Amend-
ments to the False Claims Act, 22 PUB. CONT. L.J. 684 (1993). 
131 Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. V. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 842 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). 
132 Thorpe V. Housing Auth. of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969); see Bradley V. School 
Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974) (holding that statutes apply retroactively 
unless such applications would create a "manifest injustice"). 
133 See Stewart, supra note 86, at 387 n.2. 
134 937 F.2d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 1991). 
135 The Murphy decision echoed the Supreme Court's reasoning in Bowen V. Georgetown Univ. 
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 206 (1988). In Bowen, the Court questioned the authority of federal agencies 
to issue retroactive regulations. The Court held that statutes "will not be construed to have 
retroactive effect unless their language requires this result." Id. at 208. 
136 Metzger & Goldbaum, supra note 130, at 697; see, e.g., United States V. Target Rock Corp., 
No. CV-90-4414, 1992 WL 157677, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 1992) (stating that FCA applies 
prospectively because 1986 amendments "are silent as to their retroactive application"). But see 
United States V. Stocker, 798 F. Supp. 531, 535 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (approving retroactive applica-
tion of increased damages because damages "are primarily remedial and not punitive"). 
137 In the 103d Congress, Senator Grassley proposed legislation to apply the 1986 amendments 
retroactively. Metzger & Goldbaum, supra note 130, at 701. 
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B. Qui Tam Provisions of the FeA 
Civil violations of the FCA can be prosecuted by the Attorney 
GeneraP38 or by private persons,t39 who are also known as qui tam 
relators. The relator files an FCA civil action "in the name of the 
government."140 The relator must serve the government with a copy 
of the complaint and must disclose "all material evidence and infor-
mation."141 The complaint may not be served on the defendant until 
the complaint is filed in camera for at least sixty days and until the 
court so orders.142 The government may petition the court to extend 
the review period upon a showing of good cause.143 Before the review 
period expires, the government may elect to take over the action.l44 
If the government declines to take over the action, the relator as-
sumes "the right to conduct the action."145 
1. Government Intervention 
The government does not frequently assert its right to take over 
qui tam civil actions. The DOJ has elected to intervene in less than 
one-quarter of all qui tam actions.146 When the government does in-
tervene, the government acquires "primary responsibility for prose-
cuting the action."147 
Although the government is authorized to lead the prosecution of 
qui tam actions in which it intervenes, the relator may still partici-
pate.l48 As a party to a government action, the relator may engage in 
pre-trial discovery and may call and cross-examine witnesses.149 The 
government possesses two tools, however, to control the participation 
138 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (1988) ("The Attorney General diligently shall investigate a violation 
under section 3729. If the Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is violating 
section 3729, the Attorney General may bring a civil action against the person."). 
139 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1988) ("A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 
3729 for the person and for the United States government."). 
140 [d. 
141 [d. § 3730(b)(2). 
142 [d. In advocating for in camera review of qui tam complaints, the DOJ argued that qui 
tam suits could "tip off targets of ongoing criminal investigations." S. REP No. 345, supra note 
27, at 16, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5281. 
143 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (1988). The government may not seek extensions ofthe review period 
because of a backlog of other FCA cases. See France, supra note 11, at 47. 
144 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1988). 
145 [d. § 3730(b)(4)(B). 
146 Vogel, supra note 62, at 21. 
147 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (1988). 
148 [d. Even if the government proceeds with an action, the relator "shall have the right to 
continue as a party to the action." [d. 
149 See id. § 3730(c)(2)(C), (c)(4). 
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of the relator.l50 First, the government may petition the court to stay 
discovery by the relator if such discovery interferes with the govern-
ment's investigation or prosecution.151 Second, the government may 
petition the court to restrict the relator's participation in the litiga-
tion.l52 For example, the court may limit the relator's opportunity to 
call, question, or cross-examine witnesses. 1M 
The government's power to control the litigation strategy is not 
absolute, however. For example, the court must provide a hearing if 
the relator objects to a government decision to dismissl54 or settlel55 
a false claims action. In Gravitt v. General Electric,t56 relator John 
Gravitt opposed a $234,000 settlement agreement, which was negoti-
ated by General Electric and the DOJ. The United States District 
Court for the District of Southern Ohio agreed with the relator that 
the settlement was inadequate in light of the defendant's potential 
liability under the FCA for defense contract overcharges.157 General 
Electric eventually settled for $3.5 million, and John Gravitt received 
$770,000.158 
2. Private Civil Actions 
If the government chooses not to prosecute an action initiated by a 
qui tam relator, the relator may prosecute the action.159 The govern-
ment can request copies of all pleadings and deposition transcripts.l60 
Moreover, the government may petition to take over the action at a 
later date for good cause.161 Once a relator commences a qui tam suit, 
however, no other private person may file a related action.l62 
150 [d. 
161 [d. § 3730(c)(4). 
152 [d. § 3730(c)(2)(C), (D). The court will not grant such a petition unless the relator is either 
interfering with the government's suit or harassing the defendant. See id. 
153 [d. § 3730(c)(2)(C). 
164 [d. § 3730(c)(2)(A). 
155 [d. § 3730(c)(2)(B). 
156 680 F. Supp. 1162, 1163 (S.D. Ohio 1988). 
167 [d. at 1165. 
158 France, 8U]YM note 11, at 47. 
169 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (1988). 
160 [d. 
161 [d. ("When a person proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the status and 
rights of the person initiating the action, may nevertheless permit the Government to intervene 
at a later date upon a showing of good cause."). 
162 [d. § 3730(b)(5). 
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a. The Original Source Requirement 
Qui tam relators must surmount two jurisdictional hurdles to initi-
ate a false claims action. First, relators may not file an FCA complaint 
arising from allegations that the government is already litigating 
civilly or administratively.163 In other words, relators lack jurisdiction 
to sue whenever the government has taken legal action through the 
FCA or a related remedy. Second, relators may not prosecute an FCA 
complaint that is based on publicly disclosed allegations unless the 
relator is an "original source" of the allegations.164 The FCA defines 
an original source as an "individual who has direct and independent 
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based."165 
The original source language of the 1986 amendments relaxes the 
FCA's longstanding ban on qui tam suits that utilize information 
possessed by the government. Before 1986, the FCA barred private 
actions even when the government possessed evidence of fraud pro-
vided by a relator.166 Under the new standard, relators who are the 
original source of allegations may always file suit unless the DOJ has 
already commenced legal action.167 
b. Government Employees 
The FCA does not explicitly address whether government employ-
ees can qualify as qui tam plaintiffs. As government workers enjoy 
unique access to evidence of contract fraud, it is not surprising that 
courts have often confronted this question. l68 Courts have held that 
the FCA does not specifically prohibit government employees from 
filing qui tam actions.169 In one recent case, United States ex rel. Fine 
163 [d. § 3730(e)(3) ("In no event maya person bring an action ... which is based upon 
allegations or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money 
penalty proceeding in which the Government is already a party."). 
164 [d. § 3730(e)(4)(A) ("No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based 
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions ... unless the action is brought by the 
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information."). 
Although courts cannot hear qui tam suits based on publicly disclosed information, the 
would-be relator may still qualify for some compensation if the government successfully prose-
cutes the case. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text. 
165 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
166 France, supra note 11, at 47. 
167 [d. Although "original" relators can attempt to sue based on allegations that are known to 
the government, the Attorney General is free to take over these actions. See supra text 
accompanying notes 141, 144. 
168 Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 13, at 311. 
169 Vogel, supra note 62, at 21 ("Congress specifically enumerated the classes of persons who 
could not bring qui tam suits and did not include government employees among such classes."). 
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v. Chevron, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
ruled that a government auditor who discovers evidence of fraud 
qualifies as an original source.170 Other circuit courts, however, have 
disqualified government employees whose job responsibilities enable 
them to uncover fraud. In United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon, 
a former government employee attempted to bring a qui tam suit 
using evidence that he obtained as a Quality Assurance Specialist.l7l 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded 
that such employees cannot file qui tam actions because they do not 
qualify as "original sources" within the meaning of the FCA.172 
3. Guaranteed Awards for Successful Relators 
Before the 1986 amendments, a qui tam relator could receive up to 
one-quarter of the proceeds from a successful action.173 However, as 
courts had the discretion to determine the appropriate level of com-
pensation, relators ran the risk of receiving trifling compensation.174 
The 1986 amendments strengthened the financial incentives for qui 
tam relators by setting minimum and maximum award levels.175 
In qui tam actions that are litigated by the government, most 
relators are entitled to receive between fifteen and twenty-five per-
cent of any "proceeds of the action or settlement."176 Although the 
FCA does not define "proceeds of the action or settlement," courts 
have interpreted this phrase to include both forfeiture penalties and 
damages.177 Within the prescribed range, courts are instructed to 
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1502-03 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(stating that the FCA permits any person to file suit "subject to four exceptions" and that these 
exceptions do not exclude all government employees); see also United States ex rel. Hagood v. 
Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1991). 
170 39 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1994). Noting that the 1986 amendments sought to encourage 
government employees to disclose evidence of fraud, the court ruled that it would be "incon-
gruous ... to bar a government employee who has gone to his supervisors to report fraud from 
bringing a qui tam action." [d. at 962. 
171 913 F.2d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 1990). 
172 [d. at 20. The court stated that "[t]his conclusion ... does not mean that there is no 
government employee who could qualify to bring a qui tam action under the original source 
exception." [d. 
173 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
175 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1988). 
176 [d. § 3730(d)(1). 
177 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Woodward v. Country View Care Center, Inc., 797 F.2d 888, 
891 (10th Cir. 1986). The court stated that the district court correctly computed the qui tam 
award as a percentage of both damages and forfeitures. [d. The court remanded the case for 
recalculation of the damages portion of the judgment. [d. at 892-94. 
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determine an appropriate qui tam share in light of the relator's con-
tribution to the action.178 
Although a relator cannot institute a qui tam suit based upon 
publicly disclosed information, the relator can still earn compensation 
if the government pursues the case.179 The FCA provides a reduced 
award-not to exceed ten percent of the proceeds-to relators that 
contribute to FCA actions that rely primarily on disclosures from 
hearings, reports, audits, and media coverage.l80 In determining the 
relator's award, courts consider the value of the original information 
and the relator's contribution in advancing the action.18l Congress may 
have intended this language to permit qui tam awards in government 
suits that utilize both independent information and publicly disclosed 
allegations. 182 
In qui tam actions in which the government does not intervene, the 
relator is guaranteed a higher award. The relator is entitled to receive 
between twenty-five and thirty percent of all proceeds.l83 Within this 
range, the court must award a share that "is reasonable for collecting 
the civil penalty and damages."l84 
Finally, the FCA authorizes the court to reduce awards in cases 
where the relator participated in the presentation of a false claim.l85 
Such a reduction can be levied against relators whether or not the 
government intervenes in the action.l86 In addition, the amended FCA 
178 31 U.S.C § 3730(d)(1) (1988). 
179 [d. 
180 [d. 
181 [d. As this section does not establish a minimum reward, the courts are free to deny 
compensation to persons who do not make a significant contribution to the government's case. 
See United States v. TRW, Inc., 4 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 1993). In this case, qui tam plaintiffs 
attempted to sue TRW and other companies for the submission of false claims concerning 
military jet engine contracts. [d. at 419. The government presented evidence that the relator's 
case was based on publicly disclosed information. [d. at 424. Because the government pursued 
the case, the would-be relators were eligible for up to 10% of the proceeds under 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(c)(1) of the pre-1986 statute. [d. at 423, 424. The court affirmed the district court's 
dismissal of the qui tam parties on the ground that the parties did not sufficiently contribute 
to the government's case: 
After carefully reviewing the district court's order, we are satisfied that the district 
court did not dismiss the plaintiffs on the basis of the jurisdictional bar of section 
3730(b)(4) (1982). Rather, the court reviewed the evidence, determined that material 
facts were not in dispute, and concluded that, as a matter of law, under section 
3730(c)(1) (1982) plaintiffs were not entitled to a reasonable informer's fee. 
[d. at 424. 
182 Vogel, supra note 62, at 21 (citing 132 CONGo REC. 11,244 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986) (com-
ments of Sen. Grassley». 
1&')31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1988). 
184 [d. 
185 [d. § 3730(d)(3). 
186 [d. 
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declares that private persons who are convicted of FCA criminal 
violations are not eligible for any award.187 
4. Litigation Fees 
In addition to providing successful relators with a share of the 
proceeds, the FCA enables relators to recover attorneys' fees and 
reasonable expenses.l88 These fees are awarded against the defendant 
only in successful actions, however. It should also be noted that the 
government may, under certain circumstances, recoup litigation fees 
against the defendant. l89 
In unsuccessful qui tam actions, the court may order the relator to 
pay the defendant's reasonable fees and expenses if the claim is "clearly 
frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of har-
assment."l!lO Such fees can only be awarded against the relator if the 
government has not intervened in the action.191 
5. Whistleblower Protection for Qui Tam Plaintiffs 
The 1986 amendments to the FCA also provide protection to qui 
tam relators who act as whistleblowers against their employers. Be-
fore 1986, relators who experienced employer retaliation were forced 
to seek relief under state law, which offered "widely varying" reme-
dies.l92 The amended FCA provides a uniform federal remedy for 
whistleblowers who suffer economic retaliation as a result of their 
participation in an FCA action.l93 This section not only protects qui 
tam plaintiffs but also individuals who investigate, testify, or other-
wise provide assistance in an FCA action.l94 Courts are empowered 
to order the reinstatement ofwhistleblowers.l95 In addition, courts are 
187 Id. ("[T]hat person shall be dismissed from the civil action and shall not receive any share 
of the proceeds of the action."). 
188 Id. § 3730(d)(1),(2). If relators do not succeed in recovering litigation fees against defen-
dants, relators may not seek reimbursement from the government. Id. § 3730(0 ("The Govern-
ment is not liable for expenses which a person incurs in bringing an action under this section."). 
189 Id. § 3730(g) ("In civil actions brought under this section by the United States, the provi-
sions of section 2412(d) of title 28 shall apply."). 
190 Id. § 3730(d)(4). 
191Id. 
192 See Phillips, supra note 8, at 271; see Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 13, at 277. 
193 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1988). The FCA provides relief to employees who are "discharged, 
demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the 
terms and conditions of employment" as a result of their participation in an FCA action. Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
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authorized to provide double back pay, interest on back pay, and other 
special damages including litigation fees. 196 
C. Defenses to FCA Actions 
1. Negligence or Innocent Mistake 
To demonstrate civil violations of the FCA, the government or qui 
tam plaintiff must prove that the defendant knowingly submitted 
false or fraudulent claims. Thus, the plaintiff must demonstrate the 
defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of a false claim.197 Ac-
cording to the legislative history, the FCA was not intended to punish 
mere acts of negligent conduct.198 Consequently, defendants may es-
cape FCA liability by asserting a defense of negligence or innocent 
mistake.199 To assert this defense, defendants may be required to 
prove that they made a limited inquiry into the accuracy of the claims 
and that this inquiry failed to uncover the fraud.2°O 
2. Criminal Penalties and Civil Damages May Violate Double 
Jeopardy 
Contractors that violate the FCA can be prosecuted civilly and 
criminally. In United States v. Halper,201 the Supreme Court reviewed 
the constitutionality of FCA civil and criminal prosecutions concern-
ing Medicare fraud. Halper, the manager of a medical laboratory, 
fraudulently submitted sixty-five Medicare claims for a total of $585.202 
In criminal proceedings, the defendant received a two-year sentence 
and a $5,000 fine.203 When the government then sought civil fines of 
$130,000, the defendant argued that such a penalty would represent 
a second punishment in violation of double jeopardy.204 The Court held 
that a civil penalty which is "sufficiently disproportionate" to the 
government's actual losses represents an unconstitutional second pun-
ishment.205 Thus, defendants to FCA civil actions may challenge pro-
196 [d. 
197 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra note 94. 
199 Cantwell, supra note 63, at 276. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County 
Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991). 
200 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
201 490 U.S. 435 (1989). 
202 [d. at 437. 
203 [d. 
204 [d. at 43~9. 
205 [d. at 452. 
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posed civil penalties that are excessive. Following the Halper ruling, 
the courts have continued to allow both criminal and civil penalties 
provided that the proposed damages bear some rational relationship 
to the government's 10ss.206 
3. Substantial Compliance 
Given the complexity of many government contracts, contractors 
may believe they have abided by the terms of their contracts. In FCA 
actions, contractors can assert a defense of substantial compliance 
provided that the contractors reasonably believed they followed the 
contract terms and that any deviations are minor and correctable.207 
In assessing the reasonableness of a contractor's belief in compliance, 
courts have examined the number of defects in the product, as well 
as the contractor's inspection and testing procedures.208 
4. Government Acquiescence 
If a contractor can establish that the government approved of busi-
ness practices that were later challenged as FCA violations, the con-
tractor can assert a defense of government acquiescence.209 The gov-
ernment cannot demonstrate detrimental reliance on the accuracy of 
a claim if the government knew of the alleged fraudulent conduct.210 
IV. FEDERAL CONTRACT LAW AND THE FCA 
The liability of government contractors under the FCA often turns 
on the contractors' compliance with federal contract law. Federal 
contract law is governed by a vast array of statutes and regulations.211 
Most notably, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) delineates 
the myriad obligations of government contractors.212 This section will 
206 See, e.g., United States v. Pani, 717 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (allowing civil 
damages and penalties connected to three criminal counts of Medicare fraud because proposed 
civil judgement was related to government's loss). 
207 Cantwell, supra note 63, at 276. 
208 [d. 
209 Stewart, supra note 86, at 397. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County 
Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (holding that government knowledge of falsity is not defense 
in itself but that "[s]uch knowledge may show that the defendant did not submit its claim in 
deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth"). 
210 Stewart, supra note 86, at 398. 
211 An in-depth examination of these statutes and regulations is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. For a general discussion, see JAMES F. NAGLE, A.B.A. SEC. GEN. PRAC., How TO 
REVIEW A FEDERAL CONTRACT (1990). 
212 The FAR is reproduced in 28 chapters of the Code of Federal Regulations. The first chapter, 
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briefly examine several key areas of federal contract law that give 
rise to FCA actions. In addition, this section will highlight a few FAR 
provisions that address the environmental responsibilities of federal 
contractors. 
A. Types of Government Contracts 
The obligations of government contractors vary significantly for 
different types of contracts. The FAR classifies contracts in a variety 
of ways. The most significant classifications concern the procurement 
method and the payment method.213 
1. Procurement Methods 
Federal agencies can solicit contractual services through two pro-
curement methods: sealed bids or negotiation. In sealed bid contracts, 
the government provides precise specifications describing the required 
goods or services.214 After the government issues an Invitation for 
Bids, offerers submit a bid that meets government specifications.215 A 
bid that deviates from these specifications is usually rejected as "non-
responsive."216 Among the bids that are responsive, the contracting 
officer must determine which bidders satisfy the "responsibility" re-
quirement.217 Responsible bidders must have the financial, manage-
rial, and technological capacity to perform the contract.218 The con-
tracting officer then selects the lowest bid that is both responsive and 
responsible.219 
which applies to all federal agencies, is jointly issued by the General Services Administration, 
the Department of Defense, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. See 48 
C.F.R. ch. 1 (1994). The remaining chapters contain supplemental regulations that govern 
particular agencies including the Department of Defense, 48 C.F.R. ch. 2; the Department of 
Energy, 48 C.F.R. ch. 9; and the Environmental Protection Agency, 48 C.F.R. ch. 15. A review 
of these supplemental regulations is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
213 Nagle, supra note 211, at 20. 
214 [d. at 21. 
215 [d. 
216 48 C.F.R. § 14.404-2 (1993). 
217 [d. § 9.103(a)-(b). 
218 [d. § 9.104-1. According to the FAR, responsible contractors must possess the following: 
(1) sufficient financial resources to perform contract; (2) the ability to meet proposed delivery 
of performance schedule; (3) a record of satisfactory performance in recent contracts; (4) a 
record of integrity and business ethics; (5) necessary skills in accounting, operation controls, 
technical operations, and the like; (6) necessary equipment and facilities; (7) other skills as 
needed. [d. 
219 Nagle, supra note 211, at 15. 
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For contracts in which the government cannot provide exact spe-
cifications-for example, contracts for the development of new mili-
tary technologies-the government engages contractors through ne-
gotiation.220 To negotiate a contract, the government first issues a 
"request for proposals" or "request for quotations."221 The request 
outlines the government need in general terms, enabling the offeror 
to suggest the best method to perform the contract. Agencies enjoy 
great latitude in setting selection criteria.222 During the selection proc-
ess, the agency may negotiate with the offerer to modify subcontract-
ing arrangements223 and pricing.224 
2. Payment Methods 
Contractors are paid for their services in two principle ways: fixed-
price payment and cost-reimbursement. In fixed-price contracts, the 
government and contractor agree to a final price in advance of per-
formance. Fixed-priced agreements are most appropriate for con-
tracts that include exact specifications according to which the offeror 
can compute its bid.225 Thus, most sealed bid contracts include a fixed-
price agreement. Within the rubric of fixed-price contracts, the gov-
ernment may select different methods of payment.226 
In cost-reimbursement contracts, the government estimates a total 
cost that is subject to modifications.227 The estimate of total costs 
represents a ceiling that the contractor may not exceed without the 
government's approval.228 Reimbursement contracts are selected when 
220 [d. 
221 48 C.F.R. § 15.402(a) (1994). 
222 [d. § 15.605. Although price and quality are typically considered, the agency may select the 
proposal that "offers the greatest value to the Government in terms of performance and other 
factors." [d. 
223 [d. §§ 15.700--.708. 
224 [d. §§ 15.800--.814. In most negotiated contracts, the offeror must certify the accuracy of 
its prices. See infra notes 244-49 and accompanying text. 
226 Nagle, supra note 211, at 21 ("Fixed-price contracts are used when the specifications are 
relatively definite and precise so that it is fair to impose most risks on the contractor."). 
226 48 C.F.R. § 16.2 (1994). This section provides several methods for computing fixed-price 
payments. First, the government sets a price that may not be adjusted for any reason. [d. 
§ 16.202-1 ("This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full responsibility 
for all costs and resulting profit or loss."). Second, the government may set a fixed price but 
allow for adjustments based on inflation or other economic contingencies. [d. § 16.203. Third, 
the government may agree to an initial fixed price but provide incentives based on economic 
performance. Id. §§ 16.204, 16.4. Finally, the government may agree to redetermine its initial 
fixed price after partial or full performance. Id. §§ 16.205-.206. 
WId. § 16.301-1. The government makes this initial estimate "for the purpose of obligating 
funds." [d. 
228 Contractors that exceed the ceiling price do so at their own risk. Id. 
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the government does not have precise specifications.229 Most negoti-
ated contracts, therefore, are paid through cost reimbursement. As 
with fixed-cost contracts, the government may select different pay-
ment options for reimbursement contracts.230 
Given the great potential for waste in reimbursement contracts, the 
government imposes significant restrictions on their use. First, cost 
contracts are only awarded to contractors that possess sophisticated 
accounting systems that can accurately identify contract-related ex-
penses.231 Second, contractors are only reimbursed for costs that are 
deemed "allowable" business expenses that are directly related to 
contract performance.232 Finally, the government retains the right to 
inspect and audit records until three years after final payment.233 
B. Solicitation and Bidding Requirements 
The FAR prohibits any form of collusion among contractors that 
develop prices for an offer. Most government contracts require the 
offeror to sign a "Certificate of Independent Price Determination."234 
This certificate requires offerors to pledge that they did not commu-
nicate or negotiate with other offerors in setting prices.235 In both 
sealed bidding and negotiation, offerors may not disclose their prices 
to other offerors.236 In addition, offerors may not attempt to restrict 
229 Nagle, supra note 211, at 21 ("In cost contracts the government assumes a much greater 
risk because it does not have adequate specifications, such as in research and development 
contracts, or because it needs the items so urgently that it is willing to assume a greater share 
of the risk."). 
230 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.301-.307. Some reimbursement contracts do not provide any profits to 
the contractor. In cost-sharing contracts, the government reimburses a portion of the contrac-
tor's expense and provides no fee. [d. § 16.303. Cost contracts reimburse all expenses but also 
provide no fee. [d. § 16.302. Other reimbursement contracts include an additional award. In 
contracts for high risk projects, the government can reimburse costs and provide a fixed fee 
that is set in advance. [d. § 16.306. For less risky projects, the government may award "cost-plus 
incentive fee contracts" that reimburse costs and provide a fee adjusted according to financial 
performance. [d. § 16.304. Finally, the government may reimburse costs as well as provide an 
award for "excellence in contract performance." [d. § 16.305. 
231 [d. § 16.301-3(a). 
232 Many FCA suits concern a contractor's submission of non-allowable costs. See infra notes 
268-69 and accompanying text. 
233 48 C.F.R. §§ 52.215-1 to -2 (1994). 
234 [d. § 52.203-2. 
235 [d. The offeror must certify: 
[d. 
The prices in this offer have been arrived at independently, without, for the purpose 
of restricting competition, any consultation, communication, or agreement with any 
other offeror or competitor relating to (i) those prices, (ii) the intention to submit an 
offer, or (iii) the methods or factors used to calculate the prices offered. 
236 [d. 
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competition by inducing other offerors to submit or not to submit 
bids.237 
In addition to prohibiting collusion among bidders, the FAR out-
laws the use of gratuities, fees, and kickbacks intended to secure 
favorable treatment in contract procurement.238 Contractors may not 
provide gifts or entertainment to government employees involved 
with contract selection.239 Similarly, subcontractors may not provide 
kickbacks to prime contractors "as an inducement of acknowledg-
ment" for subcontracts.24o 
The FCA has been used to combat fraud in the procurement of 
contracts. In United States v. Killough, two government officials al-
legedly solicited kickbacks from contractors seeking to provide disas-
ter relief services.241 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld an award of damages that exceeded the 
amount of the kickbacks.242 The court stated that the factfinder must 
determine the government's potential savings if the bidding were fair, 
open, and competitive.243 
C. Accurate, Complete, and Current Pricing 
For negotiated contracts where few bidders can provide the needed 
services, the government often demands the submission of pricing 
data.244 The Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) requires agency heads 
to obtain pricing data for contracts that are not awarded through 
sealed bids.245 Contractors must certify that their prices are accurate, 
complete, and current. Moreover, contractors must disclose all factual 
information that supports the computation of contract prices.246 Until 
the parties conclude a pricing agreement, contractors are required to 
update their data and factual information.247 TINA defines defective 
237 [d. 
238 [d. § § 52.203-3 to -5, 52.203-7 to -13. 
239 See id. § 52.203-5. 
240 [d. §§ 3.502-3, 52.203-7. 
241 United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988). 
242 See id. at 1532. 
243 [d. 
244 Stewart, supra note 86, at 393. 
245 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(a)(1)(A) (1988). The submission of pricing data can be waived if the 
contract price reflects "adequate price competition"; "established catalog or market prices of 
commercial items"; "prices set by law or regulation"; or "in an exceptional case when the head 
of the agency determines." [d. § 2306a(b). 
246 [d. § 2306a(g) (pricing data includes all facts that "a prudent buyer or seller would reason-
ably expect to affect price negotiations significantly"). 
247 Nagle, supra note 211, at 45. "Whether prudent buyers and sellers would reasonably expect 
a fact to affect price negotiations significantly has been determined on a case-by-case basis." [d. 
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pricing as any data that is "inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent" as 
of the date of the agreement.248 If the government overpays for a 
contract due to defective pricing, the government may obtain price 
reductions and penalties.249 
In addition to seeking remedies under TIN A, the government may 
prosecute "defective pricing" under the FCA. In contracts where 
pricing data is required, the FAR requires the contractor to sign a 
"Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data."250 In addition, the cover 
sheet for most federal contract bids requires a certification that pric-
ing information "reflects our best estimates and/or actual costS."251 
When contractors falsely certify the accuracy of pricing data, they 
submit, in effect, a false claim for payment. In several pending FCA 
suits, plaintiffs are seeking multi-million dollar judgments against 
defense contractors for defective pricing.252 
D. Allowable Costs 
Even when contractors provide accurate pricing data, the govern-
ment must still scrutinize contract expenditures to determine if they 
are allowable. Contractors cannot legally charge the government for 
extravagant or unneeded services.253 The two principal elements of 
allowability are reasonableness254 and allocability.255 In addition, allow-
able costs also must comply with applicable accounting standards,256 
the terms of the contract,257 and other FAR cost standards.258 
248 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(d)(I)(B) (1988). 
249 [d. § 2306a(e). 
260 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-4 (1994). 
251 Stewart, supra note 86, at 393. 
262 [d. at 393; see, e.g., United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Singer Co., 889 F.2d 
1327,1329,1331 (4th Cir. 1989) (approving injunction to restrict corporation from liquidating its 
assets where corporation allegedly included hidden reserves of $77 million in contract bid). 
253 Nagle, sU'fYI'a note 211, at 22. 
264 48 C.F.R. § 31.201-2(a)(I); see infra notes 259-61 and accompanying text. 
255 48 C.F.R. § 31.201-2(a)(2); see infra notes 262--67 and accompanying text. 
256 [d. § 31.201-2(a)(3). If Cost Accounting Standards are applicable to the contract, the stand-
ards affect the determination of allowability. If the standards do not apply, the government will 
consider generally accepted accounting principles. [d. 
257 [d. § 31.201-2(a)(4). 
253 [d. § 31.201-2(a)(5). The FAR provides guidance on the allowability of 52 categories of costs. 
For example, the following types of costs are generally unallowable: entertainment costs, id. 
§ 31.205-14; fines for violations of federal, state, local, or foreign laws and regulations, id. 
§ 31.205-15; and lobbying costs, id. § 31.205-22. In contrast, the following costs are usually 
allowable: labor relations costs, id. § 31.205-21; personnel recruitment costs, id. § 31.205-34; and 
transportation costs, id. § 31.205-45. 
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1. Reasonable Costs 
The FAR considers a cost to be reasonable if the cost would be 
incurred by a prudent person engaged in competitive business.259 
Where a preliminary investigation indicates that a cost may be unrea-
sonable, the contractor has the burden of proving its reasonableness.260 
Reasonableness is evaluated according to four factors: (1) whether the 
cost is ordinary and necessary; (2) whether the cost reflects sound 
business practices and applicable laws; (3) whether the cost is consis-
tent with the contractor's responsibilities to the government, other 
customers, and the public; and (4) whether the cost deviates from the 
contractor's established practices.261 
2. Allocable Costs 
In addition to demonstrating the reasonableness of a proposed cost, 
the contractor must show that the cost is "allocable" to its govern-
ment contract.262 Allocable costs must be "assignable or chargeable" 
to the contract.263 The FAR establishes three different tests that 
satisfy allocability. First, a cost is allocable if the cost specifically 
supports the contract.2M Second, a cost is allocable if the cost supports 
both the contract and other work.265 In this case, the contractor must 
determine the portion of the cost that benefits the contract.266 Third, 
a cost is allocable if the cost supports "the overall operation of the 
business."267 
3. Unallowable Costs and the FCA 
The FCA can be used to sue contractors that attempt to charge the 
government for costs that are unreasonable, improperly allocated, or 
otherwise unallowable. Thus, contractors that overcharge the govern-
ment for the cost of labor can be sued under the FCA.268 In addition, 
259 48 C.F.R. § 31.201-3(a) (1994). 
260 [d. 
261 [d. § 31.201-3(b). 
262 [d. § 31.201-2(a). 
263 [d. 
264 [d. § 31.201-4(a). 
265 48 C.F.R. § 31.201-4(b) (1994). 
266 [d. When a cost benefits both the contract and other projects, the contractor can bill the 
government for an amount "in reasonable proportion to the benefit received." [d. 
267 [d. § 31.201-4(c) (such costs are allocable "although a direct relationship to any particular 
cost objective cannot be shown"). 
268 See, e.g., United States v. Isenberg, 110 F.R.D. 387 (D. Conn. 1986). 
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contractors that utilize federal funds to support expenses that do not 
benefit the government can also be sued.269 
4. The Allowability of Environmental Costs 
When contractors are required to abate environmental hazards or 
to purchase new equipment to meet changing environmental regula-
tions, they generally seek government reimbursement for these costs. 
However, the FAR does not expressly address whether environmen-
tal expenditures can be reimbursed as allowable costS.270 
Heretofore, the government has not developed a consistent policy 
on the reimbursement of clean-up costs271 under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA).272 While some defense contractors have received reimbursement 
for CERCLA-related spending, others have not.273 To receive reim-
bursement, cost-reimbursement contractors must argue that clean-up 
costs are allowable according to FAR standards.274 Thus, contractors 
must persuade the government that a prudent person in the defense 
industry would consider hazardous waste abatement to be a reason-
able business expense.275 The government has traditionally viewed 
CERCLA clean-up costs as fines under the FAR.276 The FAR prohib-
its the reimbursement of fines that stem from a violation of federal or 
state law.277 Despite this prohibition, some courts have questioned the 
wisdom of disallowing clean-up costs that may be the result of con-
tractual compliance.278 
269 See David C. Hsia, Symposium on Qui Tam Litigation: An Overview and Introduction, 14 
J. LEGAL MED. 265, 265 (providing example of false claim in which shipyard charges U.S. Navy 
for work performed on commercial ship). 
270 Gerald P. Kohns et al., A Primer on Contractor Environmental Remediation and Compli-
ance Costs, 22 PUB. CONT. L.J. 614, 621-22 (1993). 
271Id. at 622. 
272 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
273 Kohns et al., supra note 270, at 622. A recent General Accounting Office report examined 
the cleanup of four sites used by defense contractors. The report concluded, "[dlecisions on 
reimbursement varied from a complete denial to reimbursement in proportion to the Govern-
ment's share of a company's business." Id. (quoting 34 GOV'T CONT. ,. 629 (Fed. Pub. Oct. 28, 
1992). 
274John F. Seymour, Liability of Government Contractors for Environmental Damage, 21 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 491, 527 (1992). 
275 See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
276 Kohns et al., supra note 270, at 621. 
277 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-15 (1994); see supra note 258. 
278 Kohns et al., supra note 270, at 621 & n.33 (citing United States V. General Dynamics Corp., 
No. 4-87-312 K (N.D. Tex. May 7, 1987)). 
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A proposed revision to the FAR would clarify the government's 
ambiguous treatment of environmental costs. In 1992, the Defense 
Acquisition Regulations Council proposed to add an "environmental 
cost principle" to the FAR.279 This principle would create three cate-
gories of allowable environmental costs: (1) investments in preventing 
environmental damages; (2) costs associated with the proper disposal 
of hazardous wastes; and (3) expenses necessary to comply with en-
vironmentallaws and regulations.280 The proposed rule, however, would 
disallow reimbursement for spending to correct environmental dam-
age unless certain conditions are met.281 Thus, contractors that incur 
environmental obligations due to their disregard for environmental 
laws or standard industry practices would be ineligible for govern-
ment reimbursement. 
E. Contract Specifications 
In addition to scrutinizing the allowability of contractor expenses, 
government agencies utilize detailed specifications to control the spend-
ing practices of contractors. Specifications include written instruc-
tions, industry standards, drawings, prints, and other instruments.282 
While some specifications provide exacting technical descriptions, others 
utilize a "size range or performance minimum."283 Contractors cannot 
deviate from contract specifications without first obtaining govern-
ment approval. 
The FCA can be used to sue contractors that bill the government 
for services that fail to meet contract specifications. In United States 
v. Aerodex,284 the defendant provided the Navy with "nonconforming" 
ballbearings at a cost of $27,000. While the contract required delivery 
of "PIN 17185" bearings, the defendant furnished "PIN 117971" bear-
ings.285 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
279 Seymour, supra note 274, at 496 & n.12. 
280 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-9(a)(1)(i) (proposed), reprinted in Kohns et a!., supra note 270, at 634-35. 
281 [d. § 31.205-9(c) (proposed). This section would bar reimbursement for the correction of 
environmental damage unless the contractor demonstrates: (1) that performance of a Govern-
ment contract contributed to the environmental hazard; (2) that the contractor conducted its 
business prudently, following then-accepted industry standards and all then-existing environ-
mental laws; (3) that the contractor acted promptly to minimize damages; and (4) that the 
contractor has pursued other legal and financial sources to defray environmental costs. [d. 
282 Nagle, supra note 211, at 24. 
283 [d. at 25. 
284 469 F.2d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1972) 
285 [d. at 1006. Aerodex altered the deficient bearings and relabeled the bearings with specified 
part number. Although the bearings are visually indistinguishable, the bearings are structurally 
different. [d. 
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concluded that the defendant had violated the FCA by failing to meet 
government specifications.286 The court noted that the government 
need not prove that nonconforming goods are inferior.287 
The court calculated the government's loss to be the difference 
between contract price and the reasonable value of the goods pro-
vided.288 As the defective goods were useless to the Navy, the court 
concluded that the contract price of $27,000 represented the govern-
ment's loss. The court awarded the government $54,000 under the 
double damages provision of the pre-1986 FCA.289 However, the court 
also ruled that the Navy could not collect "consequential damages" 
for the cost of replacing the ballbearings.290 
F. Contract Certifications 
Although the federal procurement process is designed to secure 
needed goods and services at a reasonable cost, the government also 
considers a variety of social and economic policy goals in awarding 
contracts.291 Some of these goals include support for small businesses 
owned by women,292 promotion of equal employment opportunities,293 
and compliance with federal environmentallaws.294 
1. Socioeconomic Certifications 
To promote these and other federal goals, the government requires 
contractors to certify compliance with certain laws, regulations, and 
policies. For example, contracts of more than $500,000 require that 
the contractor develop a plan to seek out small and disadvantaged 
businesses when awarding subcontracts.295 Contractors that fail to 
follow the plan in good faith commit a material breach of the prime 
contract.296 
286 I d. at 1008. 
287Id. at 1007 (dictum) ("The mere fact that the item supplied under contract is as good as 
the one contracted for does not relieve defendants of liability if it can be shown that they 
attempted to deceive the government agency.") 
288 Id. at 1010. 
289Id. 
290 Id. at 1011. For a more extensive discussion of consequential damages, see supra notes 
118-25 and accompanying text. 
291 Nagle, supra note 211, at 31. 
292 48 C.F.R §§ 19.902, 52.219-13 (1994). 
293Id. §§ 22.800-.810. 
294 Id. §§ 23.105(a), 52,223-1 to -2. 
295Id. §§ 19.708(b), 52.219-9. 
296 [d. § 19.702. 
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Contractors that violate socioeconomic certifications can be sued 
under the FCA. Even when contractors otherwise comply with con-
tract terms, they may be sued for breaching a contract certification. 
In United States v. Rule Industries, a government contractor certified 
that its steel hacksaw blades satisfied the Buy American Act.297 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held the contrac-
tor liable for fraud even though the contractor provided high quality 
blades.29B As the government suffered no financial loss due to the 
substitution, the government could not collect treble damages against 
the defendant.299 However, the government could obtain civil penalties 
for each fraudulent substitution.3°O 
2. Clean Air and Clean Water Certifications 
The FAR provides that contracts over $100,000 must contain a 
"Clean Water and Clean Air Certification."301 This certification re-
quires the contractor to comply with Clean Air Act (CAA)302 and 
Clean Water Act (CWA)303 mandates concerning "inspection, monitor-
ing, entry, reports, and information."304 Contractors must also agree 
that no work will be performed in a facility that violated the CAA or 
the CWA as of the date of contract formation.305 Moreover, contractors 
must use "best efforts" to comply with clean air and clean water 
standards.306 The ambiguous "best efforts" standard appears to re-
quire the contractor to use good faith in meeting statutory requirements. 
3. Other FAR Guidelines Concerning Environmental Laws 
The FAR includes several other provisions concerning environ-
mental law. For example, federal agencies are required to ensure that 
contract specifications do not exclude the use of recovered materials 
or require virgin materials.307 Unlike the CAA-CWA certification, this 
297 878 F.2d 535, 536 (1st Cir. 1989). 
298 Id. at 537--38. 
299 Stewart, supra note 86, at 396-97. 
300 Rule Indus., 878 F.2d at 538. 
301 48 C.F.R. §§ 23.105, 52.223-1 to -2 (1994). In addition, the certification must be included for 
indefinite quantity contracts that are likely to exceed $100,000 and for any contracts involving 
persons or entities that have been convicted under the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act. Id. 
302 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-7410 (1988). 
303 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
304 Id. § 52.223-2. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
3M Id. §§ 23.401-.405. These provisions incorporate several policy goals of the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 690143999k (1988). 
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provision does not bind contractors unless an agency issues specifica-
tions concerning recovered materials.30B 
The FAR does not address whether contractors must comply with 
other federal and state environmental laws. The FAR prevents con-
tractors from seeking reimbursement for fines arising from violations 
of federal and state laws309 and related legal fees.310 The FAR permits 
the reimbursement of fines, however, where violations arise from 
compliance with contractual terms.3ll 
The effect of environmental violations on contract compliance would 
be clarified by the proposed environmental cost rule.312 Although the 
proposed rule does not address whether environmental infractions 
constitute a contractual breach, the rule clearly disallows the reim-
bursement of environmental costs unless contractors comply with all 
applicable environmental laws and regulations.313 
v. POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL ApPLICATIONS OF THE FCA 
As discussed earlier, the FCA provides a broad and flexible stand-
ard for establishing false claims.314 This standard encompasses activi-
ties as far-ranging as inaccurate price quotes and invoices, breaches 
of contractual specifications and certifications, and violations of fed-
eral environmental laws. The FCA can reach fraud in virtually any 
government-funded program or activity. Consequently, environmen-
tal plaintiffs should examine the FCA's potential as a tool to challenge 
government contractors that harm the environment. 
Few cases have applied the FCA against contractors that commit 
environmental fraud. Consequently, this section focuses on identify-
ing different environmental contexts in which the FCA may be use-
fu}.315 Within these contexts, this section makes reference to a few 
published government settlements and several pending FCA lawsuits 
308 48 C.F.R. § 23.404(b) (1994). Agencies can waive the requirements of this section upon 
determining that recovered materials are not available, would not meet the performance stand-
ards of the contract, or would be unreasonably expensive. [d. 
309 [d. § 31.205-15. 
310 [d. § 31.205-47. When contractors violate laws or regulations, the FAR disallows costs for 
defending legal actions brought by the government. Seymour, supra note 274, at 530 n.l07. 
311 See Seymour, supra note 274, at 530; see supra notes 276-78. 
312 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-9 (proposed), reprinted in Kohns et al., supra note 270, at 634-35. 
313 [d. To qualify for the reimbursement of environmental remediation costs, a contract must 
demonstrate, inter alia, "compliance with all then-existing environmental laws, regulations, 
permits, and compliance agreements." [d. 
314 See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text. 
315 The contexts discussed in this section do not represent an exhaustive list of potential 
environmental applications of the FCA. Plaintiffs should explore established FCA case law to 
develop additional environmental applications. 
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involving environmental fraud. Although none of these examples rep-
resent fully litigated cases, the examples demonstrate the promise of 
the FCA as a tool to combat environmental fraud. 
A. Fraud in the Procurement or Performance of Environmental 
Contracts 
1. The Scope of Fraud in Environmental Contracts 
Since the establishment of the Superfund,316 the federal government 
has allocated huge sums of money to clean up hazardous waste at both 
private sites and federal facilities.317 The government expects to spend 
$500 billion for environmental cleanups over the next fifty years.318 
For federal facilities alone, the cost of complying with hazardous 
waste laws and cleaning up contaminated sites may exceed $150 bil-
lion.319 
Most of these funds will flow into the hands of response action 
contractors.320 These private contractors perform nearly all of the 
clean-up work directed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of Defense (DOD). 
Ironically, many defense contractors have entered the rapidly grow-
ing business of environmental restoration at DOE facilities.321 
As government spending on environmental restoration contracts 
has increased, so have opportunities for waste, mismanagement, and 
outright fraud. Between 1988 and 1991, Superfund contractors ex-
pended nearly thirty percent of total fees for administrative expenses.322 
The EPA is spending nearly three times its original projections for 
316 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). In cases where the identity of polluters cannot be established or where 
polluters cannot pay for cleanup costs, the Superfund provides funding to clean up hazardous 
wastes. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 253 (1992). 
317 Congress initially appropriated $1.6 billion for CERCLA's Hazardous Substance Response 
Fund. Id. (citing Comment, Superfund at Square One: Promising Statutory Framework Re-
quires Forceful EPA Implementation, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,101 (1981)). In 1986, 
SARA increased the fund to $8.5 billion. PLATER ET AL., supra note 315, at 253. 
318 Seymour, supra note 274, at 499. 
319Id. at 499 n.17 (citing CBO, FEDERAL LIABILITIES UNDER HAZARDOUS WASTE LAWS, at 
ix (May 1990). 
320 Andrew D. Ness & Marcia G. Madsen, Trends in Contractor Liability for Hazardous 
Wastes: The Current Legal Environment, 22 PUB. CONT. L.J. 581, 583 (1993). 
321 Seymour, supra note 274, at 498--99. 
322 Georgia Sargeant, Superfund Contractors Clean Up Few Waste Dumps, but Management 
Costs Rise, 27 TRIAL 93 (1991). Of $202 million in Superfund expenditures, $61.9 million paid for 
contractor administrative expenses. Id. 
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administrative costS.323 Although it is impossible to extrapolate the 
scope of environmental contract fraud from these statistics, environ-
mental contractors would appear to have the same opportunities for 
fraud as other contractors.324 
2. FCA Actions Against Environmental Contractors 
The FCA can be used to sue environmental contractors that know-
ingly submit false claims against the federal government. FCA suits 
may target a variety of fraudulent activities which are described 
below. 
a. Contract Acquisition Fraud 
The FCA can be used to prosecute contractors that defraud the 
government in the bidding process. For example, if contractors conspire 
to fix contract prices or provide kickbacks to government officials, the 
FCA can be used to recoup the savings the government would have 
obtained if the bidding process were open and competitive.325 
In 1988, the EPA announced a settlement agreement with Fischbach 
& Moores, Inc. (FMI), a contractor that operated wastewater treat-
ment plants in Tennessee and Georgia.326 In obtaining the EPA con-
tract to operate these plants, FMI was convicted of several counts of 
bid-rigging.327 The EPA announced a settlement agreement rescind-
ing a proposed "debarment" of FMJ.328 As one of the conditions of the 
agreement, FMI agreed to "pay any civil judgment that may be 
entered against it as a result of the False Claims Litigation, and any 
settlement that it agrees to pay as a result of the False Claims 
Litigation."329 
b. False Socioeconomic Certifications 
The FCA can also be asserted against firms that secure environ-
mental contracts through false socioeconomic certifications.33o For ex-
323 I d. at 94. 
324 See S. REP. No. 345, supra note 27, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267...u8. 
According to the Department of Justice, fraud consumes between one and ten percent of all 
Federal spending. Id. 
325 See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text. 
326 In re Notice of Proposed Debarment of Fischbach & Moores, Inc., and Its Subsidiaries, at 
*1, Oct. 22, 1988, available in LEXIS, ENVIRN Library, EPABAR File. 
327Id. at 1-2. 
328Id. at 5. 
329Id. 
330 See supra notes 295-300 and accompanying text. 
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ample, the government may sue a firm that falsely certifies ownership 
by women or minorities. Although false certifications may not always 
cause a financial loss to the government, these certifications corrupt 
the contract selection process. Even if the government cannot dem-
onstrate actual damages, the FCA authorizes the imposition of civil 
fines as well as court costs. 
In one pending FCA suit, the DOJ alleges that Kiewit Construction 
Company used two minority-owned firms as "fronts" to secure envi-
ronmental construction contracts.331 The suit maintains that the mi-
nority-owned firms did not perform all of the construction work on a 
wastewater treatment plant and other projects.332 Kiewit allegedly 
performed certain construction work that was billed through the 
minority-owned companies.333 As of February, 1995, this litigation is 
still pending. 
c. Defective Pricing in Negotiated Contracts 
When contractors submit defective prices in negotiated contracts, 
the government can sue to recover the difference between inflated 
prices and market prices.334 For example, if the EPA negotiates with 
a contractor to clean up hazardous waste at a CERCLA site, the 
contractor may be required to submit pricing information that "reflects 
[its] best estimates and/or actual costS."335 If the contractor knowingly 
submits false pricing data, the government or a qui tam relator could 
prosecute the contractor under the FCA.336 The contractor can be 
sued for forfeiture penalties equivalent to the number of invoices that 
reflect the incorrect pricing data.337 In addition, the contractor may be 
liable for triple damages that reflect the difference between the amount 
billed and the reasonable value of the services.338 
In one pending case, the DOJ has filed an FCA suit against Riedel 
Environmental Services, Inc. for misrepresenting prices in a negoti-
331 Feds Accuse Kiewit of MBE Irregularities, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Nov. 1, 1993, at 
10,10. 
332 Id. 
333 Id. Kiewit Construction Group Inc. argues that it simply provided assistance to its subcon-
tractors. Kenneth Stinson, the president of Kiewit, states that Kiewit offered "the same kind 
of support we provide nonminority contractors so that they can establish a record of perform-
ance and effectively compete." Id. 
334 See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text. 
335 See supra note 251. 
336 See supra text accompanying note 252. 
337 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 
338 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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ated contract for an emergency response cleanup.339 Riedel allegedly 
informed the EPA that the firm could not obtain liability insurance 
for less than $900,000, even though the firm received a quote of 
$234,600.340 The EPA agreed to provide Riedel with $750,000 per year 
for four years to enable the firm to self-insure against potentialliabili-
ties.341 Under the FCA, the government could seek three times the 
value of its loss against Riedel. For each year that the contract oper-
ated, this loss may represent $516,000, the difference between the 
contract price and the quoted price for liability insurance. Conse-
quently, treble damages could exceed $1.5 millon per year. 
The Riedel litigation demonstrates the great potential of the FCA 
to punish fraud in environmental cleanups. Like defense contracts, 
environmental cleanup contracts require large expenditures on tech-
nology and liability insurance.342 In light of these costs and risks, the 
EPA is often forced to negotiate with a handful of specialized firms. 
Minimal competition leads many firms to inflate prices in the negotia-
tion process. The FCA offers a powerful weapon to punish environ-
mental contractors that inflate costs. 
d. Fraudulent Invoices and Overcharges 
Contractors that submit claims for clean-up services that are not 
provided or that are unnecessary can be sued for the amount of the 
overcharge.343 For example, a response action contractor could over-
charge the government for the time of environmental engineers or 
other specialists. The FAR permits the government to audit contrac-
tor records for up to three years after final payment.344 If such an audit 
reveals discrepancies between the contractor's invoices and time sheets, 
an FCA action could be filed to collect forfeiture penalties for each 
fraudulent invoice. In addition, the government could collect treble 
damages based upon the amount of the labor overcharge. 
In one reported settlement, an EPA contractor agreed to pay an 
FCA claim arising from false test results. The Analytical Service 
Corporation (ASC) operated the Toxicon Laboratory, which tested 
339 Justice Sues Environmental Contractor for Falsely Representing Insurance Costs, [Cur-
rent Developments] 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 148 (May 21, 1993). 
34°Id. 
341Id. 
342 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 316, at 295-96 (discussing the cost and complexity of 
insurance policies for hazardous waste). 
343 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
344 See supra note 233. 
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samples from remediation activities.345 ASC agreed to pay a civil 
settlement of $490,000 to compensate the government for the corpo-
ration's false claims.346 
e. Substandard Performance 
As with other highly technical contracts, most contracts for environ-
mental services include detailed specifications concerning the materi-
als, methods, and performance standards to be used by the contractor. 
Specifications may require the contractor to reduce contaminant lev-
els to an acceptable level of risk347 or may direct the contractor to treat 
hazardous wastes in a special manner-for example, incineration.348 If 
the contractor knowingly violates these specifications and then seeks 
payment without informing the EPA of the deficiency, the contractor 
can be prosecuted for filing a false claim. 
In one such case, the EPA contracted with a company called I-Chern 
for cleansing sample bottles used at Superfund sites.349 The govern-
ment filed a suit alleging that I-Chern failed to perform EPA-man-
dated quality control procedures.350 I-Chern agreed to pay $435,000 as 
a settlement for FCA and common law claims.351 
When environmental contractors violate contract specifications, the 
FCA method of computing damages is unclear. To correct the damage 
caused by a substandard cleanup, for example, the EPA may incur costs 
far in excess of the contract price. Such costs may represent unallow-
able consequential damages according to the reasoning of Aerodex.352 
While the Aerodex court rejected consequential damages, the court 
allowed the government to recover damages based upon the full value 
of the contract.353 By arguing that a deficient cleanup has no value to 
345 In re Analytical Servs. Corp., at *1-2, Jan. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, 1993, ENVIRN 
Library, EPABAR File. 
346 Id. at *2. 
347 The acceptable level of a contaminant is measured by assessing when it poses an excess 
risk of cancer between one in ten thousand and one in ten million. See PLATER ET AL., supra 
note 316, at 890 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 51,425-26 (1988)). 
348 The incineration of contaminated soil can be far more costly than other methods of contain-
ment. For example, the EPA estimated the cost of incinerating soil at a Missouri Superfund site 
to be $41.5 million; the agency projected the cost of treating the same site by cleaning up the 
hazardous materials and burying toxic residues in clay to be $3.6 million. See id. at 896-97 (citing 
Passell, Experts Question Staggering Costs o/Toxic Cleanups, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 1, 1991, at 28). 
349 In re I-Chern Research, Inc., at *1, July 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, ENVIRN Library, 
EPABAR File. 
350 Id. at *12. 
351 Id. at *13. 
352 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
353 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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the government, the EPA can claim treble damages based upon the 
full contract price. 
B. Fraud Arising From Violations of Environmental Law 
1. The Toxic Legacy of Defense Contractors 
Defense contractors represent one of the largest classes of environ-
mental polluters.354 The disposal of munitions has contaminated the 
soil and groundwater surrounding many government owned-contrac-
tor operated (GOCO) facilities.355 In addition, the production of en-
riched uranium for nuclear weapons and naval propulsion has yielded 
highly toxic wastes and groundwater contamination.356 A 1992 study 
by the General Accounting Office indicated that clean-up costs asso-
ciated with ten defense contractors could exceed $1 billion.357 The 
government has only recently begun to confront this toxic legacy. In 
Fiscal Year 1992, the DOE received over $1 billion for environmental 
cleanups.358 
The liability of defense contractors for any portion of these costs has 
proved to be a controversial issue.359 In some cases, defense contrac-
tors have challenged environmental lawsuits by invoking the govern-
ment's sovereign immunity.360 Furthermore, in cases where contrac-
354 See America's Worst Polluters, 84 Bus. & SOc'y REV. 21 (1993). The Council of Economic 
Priorities recently named eight companies as the worst polluters in America. '!\vo of these 
companies-DuPont and Rockwell-were cited for pollution generated from defense contracts. 
Id. at 22, 23. Between 1950 and 1989, Dupont operated a nuclear weapons complex in South 
Carolina. Id. at 22. This plant "has been connected to elevated levels of leukemia, lung cancer, 
and other diseases." Id. Rockwell operated a similar plant in Colorado, dumping hazardous 
waste at least 166 separate times. Id. at 23. 
355 Maj. Mark J. Connor, Government Owned-Contractor Operated Munitions Facilities: Are 
They Appropriate in the Age of Strict Environmental Compliance and Liability, 131 MIL. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1991). Most munitions plants are managed as government owned-contractor operated 
(GOCO) facilities. Id. Many GOCO facilities have been operating since World War II. Id. at 4-5. 
As the development and operation of these facilities "pre-dated heightened sensitivity to envi-
ronmental concerns, environmental problems abound at GOCO munitions facilities today." Id. 
at 5. 
356 Stanley Millan, Environmental Dilemma of Defense Contractors-Cheshire Grin or Smile 
of Immunity, 2 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 15, 16 (1989). 
357 Kohns et aI., supra note 270, at 616. 
358 Id. at 615. In Fiscal Year 1992, the total budget for Department of Defense environmental 
compliance and cleanup activities approached $3.7 billion. Id. In Fiscal Year 1993, the Depart-
ment of Defense environmental appropriation is nearly $4 billion. Id. 
359 Id. at 616. 
360 Most federal environmental laws contain waivers of sovereign immunity, which extend to 
federal facilities and contractors. See Kohns et aI., supra note 270, at 619. Nevertheless, con-
tractors that operate military installations often claim sovereign immunity. In one case, Presi-
dents Carter and Reagan exempted Fort Allen from compliance with portions of RCRA, the 
CAA, and other statutes. See Connor, supra note 352, at 48. 
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tors have incurred liability under CERCLA or other environmental 
statutes, the government has at times agreed to reimburse all or some 
of the contractors' costS.361 Given the difficulty of suing defense con-
tractors under existing environmental statutes, the FCA may offer 
an important alternative. 
2. FCA Actions Against Defense and Other Contractors 
The FCA can be employed against DOD, DOE, EPA, and other 
federal contractors that cause environmental damage in violation of 
their contractual obligations. Potentially, FCA liability can be estab-
lished by demonstrating a contractor's failure to abide by promises to 
comply with the CAA and the CWA362 or other environmental laws. 
In addition, fraudulent attempts to bill the government for environ-
mental fines or penalties may violate the FCA.363 
a. False Certifications of Compliance with the CAA and the CWA 
As noted above, the FAR requires government contractors to cer-
tify compliance with both the CAA and the CWA for contracts in 
excess of $100,000.364 Contractors agree to comply with inspection and 
monitoring requirements of the CAA and the CWA.365 Thus, a defense 
contractor that fails to monitor compliance with these statutes may 
be liable for submitting false claims. In addition, contractors agree to 
use "best efforts" to comply with the substantive requirements of the 
CAA and the CWA.366 Contractors that fail to use "best efforts" to 
comply with the substantive provisions of either the CAA or the CWA 
may be submitting false certifications. These false certifications may 
be actionable as false claims. 
While no FCA cases concerning the CAA-CWA certification have 
been litigated, the government has settled one FCA case that may 
have involved these certifications.367 In 1990, Geo-Con, Inc. contracted 
with the EPA to clean up a Superfund site in Pennsylvania.368 Two 
361 See Kohns et aI., supra note 270, at 622. 
362 See supra notes 301--06 and accompanying text. 
363 See supra notes 309--11 and accompanying text. 
364 See supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
365 See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
366 See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
367 Administrative Settlement Agreement Between Geo-Con, Inc., the Department of the 
Army, and the Environmental Protection Agency, at *1, May 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, 
ENVIRN Library, EPABAR File. Although the settlement agreement did not reveal the 
nature of the alleged FCA claims, the facts identified in the settlement agreement suggest 
violations of the CAA and the CWA. 
368 Id. 
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Geo-Con employees tampered with critical safety equipment includ-
ing an air monitoring device and a water meter.369 In recognition of a 
"monetary payment to be paid by Geo-Con," the government agreed 
to refrain from pursuing an FCA action.370 
The computation of damages for violations of the CAA-CWA cer-
tification is problematic. Treble damages cannot be awarded unless 
the government demonstrates a financial injury.371 The government 
cannot assert damages based on the total contract price if it received 
valuable services from the contractor.372 In this case, the government 
must show a financial injury arising from a breach of the CAA-CWA 
certification. As we have seen, most courts will not award damages 
flowing from cleanup costs as these are consequential damages. Nev-
ertheless, the government can still obtain substantial civil fines for 
each fraudulent claim. 
b. Violations of Other Environmental Statutes 
False claims may arise from violations of particular environmental 
laws in cases where contractors have contractually pledged to obey 
those environmental laws.373 In addition, as the FAR prohibits con-
tractors from seeking reimbursement of fines and legal fees connected 
with violations of state or federal law, the FCA potentially can be used 
to sue contractors that fraudulently attempt to recoup such costS.374 
In one pending case, James S. Stone, a qui tam relator, has brought 
an FCA suit against Rockwell International Corporation (Rockwell), 
a government contractor that operated the Rocky Flats nuclear weap-
ons facility.375 In the course of producing "triggers" for nuclear war-
heads,376 Rockwell allegedly violated federal environmental laws in-
cluding the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the 
369 [d. 
370 [d. at *5--6. 
371 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. 
372 Compare United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 1972) (awarding 
damages based upon the total contract price where defective parts were worthless to the 
government) with United States v. Rule Indus., 878 F.2d 535, 538 (1st Cir. 1989) (rejecting civil 
damages where foreign-made hacksaw blades violated contract certification but did not cause 
financial injury to the government). Although Aerodex involves a violation of contract specifica-
tions, the holding would apply to a violation of certifications that result in a financial injury. 
373 In addition to the CAA-CWA certification, many federal contracts include agreements or 
certifications involving other environmental laws. For example, see supra notes 307-08. 
374 See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text. 
375 United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 144 F.R.D. 396, 398 (D. Colo. 1992) 
(order granting defendant's Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production). 
376 Complaint Under False Claims Act at 11, United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l 
Corp. (D. Colo. filed July 5, 1989) (No. 89-C-1154). 
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CAA, and the CWA.377 Stone has alleged that Rockwell violated fed-
eral environmental and safety laws, Colorado environmental laws, 
DOE orders, and contract agreements concerning plant safety.378 Ac-
cording to Stone, Rockwell concealed these violations from the DOE 
in order to secure contract payments.379 
Rockwell has conceded, in a plea agreement unrelated to Stone's FCA 
suit, that the Rocky Flats plant violated RCRA380 and the CWA.38J 
Nonetheless, Rockwell asserts that the DOE acknowledged and con-
doned the environmental hazards at Rocky Flats.382 Indeed, Rockwell 
argues that any alleged false claims were sanctioned by the federal 
government.383 
The Rockwell litigation raises two fascinating issues concerning 
FCA actions for environmental fraud: (1) whether the FCA reaches 
negligent violations of environmental laws; and (2) whether the FCA 
377 [d. at 8-9. 
378 See Rockwell [nt'l Corp., 144 F.R.D. at 398. A discussion of Stone's allegations concerning 
violations of federal safety laws, Colorado environmental laws, DOE orders, and various gov-
ernment agency agreements is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
379 [d. 
380 Plea Agreement and Statement of Factual Basis at 7-14, United States v. Rockwell Int'l 
Corp. (Criminal Case) (on file with the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review). 
The plea agreement identifies four counts of intentional violations of RCRA: (1) "illegal storage 
of mixed hazardous wastes known as 'poncrete' and 'saltcrete,' in violation of RCRA," id. at 
7-10; (2) "illegal storage of mixed hazardous wastes on the 904 Pad, without RCRA permit or 
interim status," id. at 11-12; (3) "illegal treatment and storage of mixed hazardous in Solar 
Evaporation Pond 207C, without RCRA permit or interim status," id. at 12-13; and (4) "illegal 
storage of mixed hazardous wastes known as 'vacuum filter sludge,' without a permit or interim 
status," id. at 13-14. 
381 The plea agreement identifies five counts of negligent violations of the CWA: (1) "discharg-
ing and releasing non-sanitary industrial wastes" in violation of National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit, id. at 6, 15-18; (2) exceeding NPDES permit limits for 
five-day Biological Oxygen Demand (Bod-5) in March, 1988, id. at 18,20; (3) exceeding the Bod-5 
and fecal coliform limits of NPDES permit in April, 1988, id. at 20; (4) exceeding the Bod-5limit 
of NPDES permit in May, 1988, id. at 21; and (5) allowing chromic acid spill to reach sewage 
treatment plant and B-3 pond, id. at 24. 
The plea agreement also presents one intentional violation ofthe CWA: "knowingly violating" 
NPDES permit of Rocky Flats "by 'spray-irrigating' water from Pond-3 contrary to good 
engineering practices." [d. at 21. 
Violations of the CAA or the CWA could be actionable as false claims if Rockwell signed a 
CAA-CWA certification. See supra note 301 and accompanying text. If Rockwell's violations 
implicate the CWNs testing or monitoring requirements, the violations may be actionable as 
false claims. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. Alternatively, Rockwell's violations 
would be actionable as false claims if Rockwell failed to use "best efforts" to comply with the 
substantive provisions of the CWA. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. A thorough 
examination of Rockwell's compliance with the CWA is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
382 Telephone Interview with Christopher J. Koenigs, Attorney at Williams, Youle & Koenigs, 
P.C. (Defense Counsel for Rockwell International Corporation) (Feb. 16, 1994). 
383 [d.; see infra note 393 and accompanying text. 
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reaches intentional violations that the government may have con-
doned. Rockwell's negligent and intentional violations of RCRA and 
other environmental laws may be actionable as false claims-provided 
that Rockwell contractually agreed to observe these environmental 
laws. 
Rockwell has acknowledged that it negligently violated the CWA.384 
As noted earlier, merely negligent acts do not constitute false 
claims,385 and negligent actors do not meet the FCA's scienter require-
ment.386 To challenge Rockwell's negligence defense, Stone must es-
tablish that Rockwell knowingly violated the environmental obliga-
tions of its contract.387 Even if Stone cannot establish that Rockwell 
knowingly breached environmental obligations, Stone can argue that 
Rockwell's negligent actions constituted gross negligence. Two fed-
eral district courts have ruled that acts of gross negligence satisfy the 
FCA's knowledge requirement.386 
In addition to negligent violations of law, Rockwell concedes that it 
intentionally violated federal environmentallaws.389 In theory, false 
claims may arise from intentional violations of the law. The plaintiff 
must establish either that the contractor pledged to observe the law 
in question390 or that the contractor illegally sought reimbursement of 
fines or legal costS.391 
384 See supra note 381. It is important to note that many of Stone's allegations are substanti-
ated in public documents, including the criminal plea agreement. Rockwell has challenged 
Stone's standing as a qui tam relator by pleading that "plaintiff's allegations are based upon 
publicly disclosed information and plaintiff is not the 'original source' of such information." 
Defendant's Answer at 4, United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. (Criminal Case) 
(on file with the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review); see 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(e)(4)(B) (1988). Stone maintains that he is the original source of the allegations: 
To the extent that this action may be based on the public disclosure of allegations or 
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, adminis-
trative, or Government Accounting Office Report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or 
from the news media, Stone is the "original source" of the information .... 
Complaint Under False Claims Act at 5, United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. (D. 
Colo. filed July 5, 1989) (No. 89-C-1154). 
385 See supra notes 94, 199-200 and accompanying text. 
386 See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. 
387 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
388 Tvvo federal district courts have agreed that the FCA applies in cases of "gross negligence 
where the submitted claims to the government are prepared in such a sloppy or unsupervised 
fashion that [the submitted claims] resulted in overcharges .... " United States v. Enton, 750 
F. Supp. 512, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting 132 CONGo REC. H9389) (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) 
(statement of Rep. Bermar»; accord United States v. Blanka, 858 F. Supp. 5, 13 (D.D.C. 1994). 
389 See supra notes 380--8l. 
390 See supra notes 301-11 and accompanying text. 
391 See supra note 309-10 and accompanying text. 
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Even if Rockwell knowingly presented false claims by concealing 
intentional violations, Rockwell can raise the defenses of substantial 
compliance and government acquiescence. To raise the defense of 
substantial compliance, Rockwell must demonstrate a reasonable be-
lief in contract compliance.392 To raise the defense of government 
acquiescence, Rockwell must prove that the government knew of 
Rockwell's fraudulent conduct.393 In light of the long history of envi-
ronmental infractions at Rocky Flats,394 Rockwell may prevail on a 
defense of government acquiescence. 
If Rockwell has sought reimbursement for fines arising from viola-
tions of state or federal environmental laws, Rockwell may have 
submitted false claims. Although federal contract law disallows the 
reimbursement of fines,396 some federal contracts include special terms 
that permit the recovery of fines and related fees.396 Without a careful 
examination of Rockwell's contract, it is unclear whether Rockwell 
can legally obtain reimbursement of environmental fines or legal ex-
penses.397 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The FCA may provide the government and private citizens with a 
powerful weapon against environmental fraud. As the government 
continues to invest greater resources in environmental programs, 
environmental fraud is likely to rise. The FCA can be used to sue EPA 
892 See supra notes 207--{)8 and accompanying text. 
393 As a defense to Stone's FCA suit, Rockwell has asserted that Stone ''is barred by the 
doctrines of waiver and estoppel in that representatives of the United States government, by 
their actions and statements, recognized that the claims which are the subject matter of this 
law suit were allowable." Defendant's Answer at 4, United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l 
Corp. (Criminal Case) (on file with the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review). In 
a separate defense, Rockwell argues that the alleged FCA violations ''were the subject of 
independent investigation, evaluation, and acquiescence and/or approval by the United States 
government." [d. 
For a discussion of the government acquiescence defense, see supra notes 209-10 and accom-
panying text. 
394 See supra note 354. 
396 See supra note 309-10 and accompanying text. 
396 See Seymour, supra note 274, at 530. For example, the government would reimburse a 
contractor for environmental fines and penalties if the contract expressly required "that haz-
ardous substances must be stored, labeled, or transported in particular ways that violate 
environmental laws .... " [d. 
397 Rockwell has sought reimbursement of legal fees under the terms of its "cost plus" 
reimbursement contract. See Adriel Bettelheim, DOE Picks up Court-Cost Thb for Rockwell, 
DENVER POST, Sept. 20, 1993, at AI, available in LEXIS, News Library, DPOST File. In fact, 
the DOE has reimbursed Rockwell for $1.56 million in legal fees arising from Stone's FCA suit. 
[d. 
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contractors that cheat the government when providing cleanup serv-
ices. In addition, the FCA can be used to check defense and other 
contractors that fail to observe environmental laws. 
Application of the FCA to combat environmental fraud will force 
government contractors to respect environmental laws and to provide 
cost-effective environmental services. Although it appears doubtful 
that the FCA can compel defendants to pay environmental cleanup 
costs, the FCA imposes substantial civil fines and damages. In addi-
tion to offsetting government losses, FCA judgments benefit qui tam 
plaintiffs who discover environmental fraud. Thus, the FCA empow-
ers citizens to lead the way in applying an old statute to an emerging 
problem. 
